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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to construct an explanatory
framework for the assessment of Soviet leadership attitudes
to arms control and disarmament negotiations and treaties.
The purpose is to establish the objectives and motives of
the Soviet Union's arms control and disarmament policies.
These objectives and motives are then categorized according
to seriousness of intent to conclude agreements with
potential enemies.
Six explanatory variables have been chosen as most
likely determinants of the Soviet Union's policy and are
employed on a chronological basis with sections divided
according to change of leadership.
A conclusion on the
relative explanatory value of each variable is made at the
end of each section. The general conclusion draws together
the
observable
data
to
identify
the
most
dynamic
determinants of the Soviet Union's arms control policy and
to identify necessary over sufficient conditions for the
successful conclusion of negotiations.
The
results
suggest
that
parity
of
military
capabilities is the necessary condition for agreements to
be signed.
Military inferiority will lead the USSR to
engage in negotiations while building up her military
strength.
The most persistent objective of engaging in
negotiations with serious intent is the pressing need to
divert scarce resources to civilian sectors of the Soviet
economy.
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This study attempts to construct a general framework to assess
the motives and attitudes of the Russian/Soviet leadership from 1899
to 1987 relating to the issues of arms control and disarmament. Due to
the lack of relevant data points, the sometimes obsessive secrecy of
the Soviet decision-making process, and the imprecision of assessing
the relative influence of relevant factors on that process, one must
first acknowledge that conclusions will be somewhat tentative and
conjectural in nature. Research on a specific aspect of foreign policy
must also attempt to identify how that aspect fits into the overall
objectives of policy without incorporating an overwhelming array of
interacting factors. Conclusions will therefore be suggestive rather
than predictive.
Ihis study will lay stress on tendencies rather than interests
within the Soviet leadership in an attempt to identify the conditions
in which any leader builds a coalition for the promotion of arms
control and disarmament policy. Apart from the period of Stalin's
dictatorial rule, there has been a clear plurality of interests within
the hierarchical Soviet leadership. The aim of the study is to
identify first, the underlying motives and justifications for pusuit
of specific policies, and second, to identify the priority attatched
to pursuit of those policies.
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Hie

meaningful

conduct

of

arms

control

and

disarmament

negotiations and the conclusion of agreements is not possible without
the political will of two or more parties. Since 1945, Soviet foreign
policy has in many ways been reactive to US policy, but it is beyond
the scope of this study to identify the coincidence of US and Soviet
positions except in the obvious instances when common goals and
interests enabled the signing of key agreements.

The focus of this

study is the Russian and Soviet leadership*s perception of established
trends in military capabilities, particularly in terms of the concept
of parity.
The thesis of this study argues that a clear parity of military
capabilities between the Soviet Union and one or more states perceived
as threatening is the necessary condition for the USSR to enter into
negotiations with serious intent and conclude meaningful arms control
and disarmament agreements.

A perceived condition of inferiority of

military capabilities will most likely lead the USSR to pursue arms
control

and disarmament

negotiations

whilst building up

those

capabilities. The most dynamic sufficient condition is the persistent
pressure to divert scarce Soviet resources toward domestic economic
needs.
Arms control is defined as the substance and process of all
international negotiations concerned with regulating armaments. (1)
Disarmament is defined as measures that significantly lower the level
of armaments.

(2)

The essential difference between the two is that
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arms control is directed at the regulation and management of a build
up in military force capabilities between states perceived as
threatening,

whereas disarmament is concerned with halting and

reversing that build-up, more commonly referred to as an arms race.
A stated aim of 'General and Complete Disarmament1 has been a
part of official Soviet doctrine since the 1920s. Ihis is why arms
control is usually referred to in Soviet pronouncements as 'partial
measures of disarmament.' There are also two Russian phrases for arms
control which have slightly different connotations:

'Kontrol za

vooruzheniimi' which implies looking after control over armaments, and
'Kontrol nad vooruzheniimi' which implies sweeping control over
armaments and suggests authority to order or stop the production of
weapons. (3) Soviet attitudes to arms control and disarmament will be
seen to have evolved according to developments in the international
environment over the course of the century.
Both arms control and disarmament share the features of the
recognition of a common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation
and cooperation between potential enemies with respect to their
military establishments.

(4)

Both share the objectives of reducing

the likelihood of war, reducing the damage of war should it break out
and reducing the economic burden of preparing for war.
These objectives have become particularly pronounced since the
nuclear arms race began at the end of World War II and provide the
original impetus to undertake this study, which was an attempt to
answer the following questions: Why has the record of arms control
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and disarmament treaties been so modest despite the recognition of
the catastrophically destructive nature of nuclear war?

Was there a

shared commitment to avoid it upon which agreement could be based?
The conduct and substance of arms control and disarmament
negotiations and agreements in this study are argued to be dependent
variables of the Soviet Union's military relationship with potential
enemies in terms of the concept of parity. This is defined as a
condition of approximate equivalence between military forces. If the
capabilities of two military forces are equal, then parity exists
between them, regardless of the specific composition of the forces.
Arms control and disarmament agreements address the confirmation and
consolidation of this parity.
Parity can take several forms:

It can be based on a regional or

strategic balance of forces, a conventional or nuclear balance of
forces and a qualitative or quantitative balance of forces, often
referring to the relative technological features which make up a
particular balance of forces.

There is also a general parity where

the overall balance of forces are equivalent.
Analysis is undertaken on a chronological basis and begins in
1899 in order to incorporate the events leading up to World War I and
the 1917 Revolution with the aim of establishing a contrast, if any,
between the Tsarist and Bolshevik regimes' conduct of policy. The
study ends with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of
1987, the first disarmament treaty of modern times.
The study is divided into chapters roughly corresponding to
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changes in the chief executive of Russia/Soviet Union.

The first

covering both Tsar Nicholas II and Lenin and the last covering the
period from the SALT II Treaty to the INF Treaty which included a
succession crisis of four different leaders, finally ending with
Gorbachev.

In between, the leaderships of Stalin, Khrushchev and

Brezhnev are analyzed.
Each chapter is sub-divided into three basic sections. Firstly,
there isa survey of the main arms control events of the period and
the development of negotiating positions is recounted.
there isa detailed analysis of
light ofthese events.

Secondly,

the chief explanatory variables in

Thirdly,

there is a brief summary of each

variable's relative value in explaining the extent to which the Soviet
leadership entered into meaningful negotiations with seriousness of
intent.
Six variables have been chosen to best explain the motivation of
Russian/Soviet arms control and disarmament negotiating positions and
policy aims.

They constitute the basic framework of analysis and are

employed wherever applicable in each chapter.
The first is the relative military capability of the USSR with
reference to the concept of parity.

As mentioned above, this factor

is argued to be the necessary factor which explains the conduct with
serious

intent

of

negotiations

and

conclusion

of

agreements.

Inferiority of capabilities will dispose the USSR to enter into
negotiations whilst building up her military strength.
Domestic economic imperatives, particularly in terms of the
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allocation of scarce resources, is the second factor examined as an
explanatory variable of Soviet negotiating positions.

Analysis will

center on the question of whether the USSR enters into negotiations
and agreements with the aim of diverting resources from the military
to the civilian sectors of the economy.
The third variable examined is domestic politics.
prestige invested

Is the

in success of arms control negotiations and

consequent political gains by Soviet leaders a key factor in the
conduct of those negotiations?
The fourth explanatory variable is propaganda value.

Are arms

control and disarmament positions employed solely for their propaganda
value?

Objectives can be numerous but include the aim of influencing

public opinion

or

undermining

the political consensus

amongst

potential enemies.
Fear of the consequences of nuclear war is the fifth variable.
Has fear

driven the USSR to assume a positive attitude towards arms

control and disarmament?

This variable is only employed in analysis

of periods following 1945.
The sixth and final variable is China. Does the USSR enter into
serious negotiation with the aim of concluding agreements with the aim
of minimizing the threat posed by China?

This factor becomes

operational after the Sino-Soviet split of 1959.
These variables are employed throughout the study with the aim of
establishing the Russian and Soviet leaderships* attitudes towards
arms control. These attitudes are then categorized according to periods
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when the leadership abstains from negotiations, will negotiate without
intention

to conclude

agreements,

intention to reach agreement

will negotiate with

and finally, manages

serious

to conclude

agreements with potential enemies.
Ihis is the framework of. analysis.

The first period it is

applied to is 1899 to 1928 and the leaderships of Tsar Nicholas II and
Lenin.

CHAPTER I
FROM TSAR NICHOLAS II TO LENIN

The period 1899 to 1928 was one of immense change for the Russian
people.

The Great War of 1914-1918 unleashed revolutionary forces

which swept away the Tsarist regime of Nicholas II and led to the
establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the
leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Despite the enormity of the change
in the form and direction of political leadership, Russia and the USSR
remained a country beset by economic backwardness and social strains.
Consequently, both regimes required domestic and foreign policies
which would enhance stability and security whilst minimizing any
external threat.

Negotiations and agreements concerning arms control

and disarmament

was

one

such foreign policy pursued by both

leaderships with some success.

Possible explanations of the factors

underlying pursuit of this policy are various, and yet there is a
consistency in the conduct and objectives of negotiation throughout
the period.

A.W. Rudzinski stated that the first Soviet government

’adapted to their own ends a time-honored device of the traditional
foreign policy of many governments including those of Tsarist Russia.'
(1) It is to that government that I shall turn first.
The period leading to the First World War was characterized by a
race in armaments between the major European powers, particularly
Germany and Great Britain.

In 1899 and 1907, agreement was reached at

conferences held at the Hague in the Netherlands dealing with the
issues of armaments,

the conduct of warfare and the management of
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disputes between states.
with the exception of
expanding bullets

On July 29th, 1899, all major world powers
the United States declared the use of both

andasphyxiating or deleterious gases

in war

prohibited.

Both of these proposals were sponsored by the Russian

delegation.

There was also agreement on other conventions for the

conduct of warfare.

On October 18th, 1907, agreement was reached on

the prohibition of bombing from the air by hot air balloon, a
convention

regulating

the

laying

of

submarine mines

and the

introduction of compulsory arbitration for international disputes
through a permanent

Court of Arbitration.(2) The Russian desire to

address a greater range of disarmament and arms control issues

in

those conferences was opposed by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.

The

limited agreements reached did not forestall war which broke out in
1914.
It was Tsar Nicholas II of Russia who initiated the 'drive for
disarmament' when he called for an international peace conference on
August 24th, 1898.

The Tsar's Rescript of that date draws attention

to the costs of the 'progressive development of existing

armaments'

and the increasing risk of disaster through lack of restraint on this
process.

(3)

Particular emphasis was placed on the economic burden

of the arms race; production of wealth was seen to be paralysed and
economic progress misdirected through unceasing armament.

The agenda

set by Count Mouraviev for the Hague conferences placed the reduction
of arms and prohibitions on the use of new weapons and 'explosives of
a formidable power' as priorities.

(4)

In calling the conference to

address such issues, the Tsar's motives were far less altruistic than
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a desire for universal lasting peace.

Two profound fears stimulated

the call for negotiations.
In order to offset the considerable military threat posed by
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire on Russia's Western border,
the Tsar immediately entered into a political and military alliance
with France following the demise of a similar treaty with Germany in
1890.

This was designed to preserve the 'balance of power' in

continental Europe, a policy which would engage Russia and France in
war against Germany and Austria.

By 1898, Europe was engaged in an

arms race which threatened the stability of the balance of power and
the prospect of war loomed ever closer.

Russia's military weakness

with regard to Germany and Austria was made more disturbing by the
superiority of Austria's artillery, their new Mannlicher infantry
rifle and the rapidly increasing rate of German armament. (5) The Tsar
perceived a threat which could not be met by the relatively weak
military capabilities of Russian power.
Second to Russia's relative military weakness was the economic
burden necessary for Russia to develop her own armaments in line with
those of her Western neighbors.

The exposure of Tsarist rule to the

test of war was considered a strain that the Russian economy and
society could not bear without risk of revolution.

This was the

prophetic analysis of Jean de Block, a Tsarist Counsellor of State, in
his book 'The Future War from the Technical, Economic and Political
Point of View' published in 1897.

In it, he stated:

the destructiveness of modem warfare, with its frightful
new weapons, becomes so appalling that a general European
War would bring the universal bankruptcy of nations and
threatens social revolution in almost every country in
Europe. (6)
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His suggestion to the Tsar, in light of the economic and social
burdens of war, Russia's technical backwardness and the dangers to
peace posed by the shifting balance of power, was to settle disputes
by arbitration.

This was the basis for the Tsar's call for a

conference to discuss the issues of peace and disarmament in 1899, the
Tsar's Rescript.

The Rescript was an exact copy of Block's

recommendations but for the omission of the Stated fear of social
revolution. Nonetheless, the strains of war, after 1944, were too much
for the Tsarist regime to bear, revolution ensued and the government
fell.
Lenin on Disarmament

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 established a new regime in
Russia which was then renamed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR).

This new regime was headed by Vladimir I. Lenin.

His

writings and pronouncements during the course of his life provide in
large part the ideological framework for the organization, conduct and
aspirations of life within the Soviet Union and its relations with the
rest of the world - Marxism-Leninism. It is the foremost stated aim of
the USSR's ruling body - the Communist Party of the Soviet union
(CPSU) - to lead the proletariat towards Communism in strict adherence
to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.
principles was unthinkable.
is difficult to overestimate.

Deviation from those

Lenin's impact on the history of the USSR
(7)

Whilst the Tsar attempted to stave off war at the Hague
Conferences, Lenin wrote a pamphlet entitled 'Army and Revolution' in
1905.

In it, he called for the elimination of standing armies and

their replacement by the armed militia of the people as a whole.

His
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view of disarmament was clearly stated:
Let the hypocritical or sentimental bourgeoisie dream
about disarmament. While there is still oppression
and exploitation on earth, we must strive not for
disarmament but for universal, popular armament. Only
it can entirely ensure freedom. (8)
In 1906, Lenin expanded on Clausewitz's belief that war is
nothing but a continuation of policy by non-peaceful means when he
pronounced that great questions in the life of nations are settled
only by force.

(9) These were the utterances of a revolutionary who

saw disarmament as counter-revolutionary and a pacifist illusion.
In the immediate pre-revolutionary period of 1916, Lenin wrote
‘The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution* which contained a
section on the 'Slogan of Disarmament'. He writes:
To dream of disarmament was to express utter hopelessness
about the prospect of revolution.... Every peace program is
a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless
its principle object is to explain to the masses the need
for a revolution. (10)
These pronouncements were consistent with his view that war with the
capitalist states was inevitable.

As events were to show, pragmatism

and the security imperatives of the newly bom Soviet State soon took
precedence over revolutionary ideological fervor. Lenin presided over
peace treaties which included disarmament clauses between 1917 and
1921 - a period E.A. Korovine labels 'The Struggle for Peace'

(11) -

and went on to endorse disarmament negotiations and policies up to his
death in 1924.

(12)

This policy remained consistent through to

Stalin's succession late in 1927.
Before analysing the factors which best account for this shift, I
will briefly outline the disarmament and arras control events of the
first years of the Soviet Union.
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The Struggles for Peace and Disarmament.

The Soviet Union signed several peace treaties to end involvement
in World War One, the most significant being the Brest-Litovsk Treaty
with Germany in March 1918. These treaties included clauses for arms
limitation, such as the establishment of a frontier zone with Finland
wherein there would be a limit imposed of 2,500 men on each side with
no artillery.

Following this, the Soviet Union became positively

disposed to pursue broad disarmament proposals.

However, apart from

signing the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and
bacteriological methods of warfare in 1927, no meaningful agreements
were reached.

Soviet arms control and disarmament proposals from 1921

to 1927 were nonetheless numerous and persistent.
Although the USSR was not a party to the Washington naval
Conference of 1922, M. Tchicherin, Soviet Foreign Commissar, stated on
July 19th 1921, *The Russian Government will be happy to welcome any
disarmament as a reduction of the military charges which burden the
workers of all countries.’

(13)

At the Genoa conference of 1922,

Tchicherin proposed a general reduction of armaments...
applied to the armies of all countries, and that the
rules of war are completed by absolute prohibition of
the most barbarous forms of warfare, such as gas, and
aerial warfare, and also the means of destruction
against the non-combatant population. (14)
The proposal was opposed by Britain and France. On May 18th 1922, the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee considered it ’particularly
just and timely that the delegation, when it first took its post at
the conference, proposed general disarmament.' (15)
first

time

that

the

Soviet

Government

had

This was the

proposed

general

disarmament. It was to become a central and recurrent theme in their
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disarmament and arms control policy.
In December 1923, a Soviet delegation arrived in Rome as part of
a committee to study applications of the principles of the Washington
agreements.

The delegation supported a limit on Soviet tonnage

reducing it by over a third from 490,000 tons to 280,000 tons.

It

also supported neutralization of the Bosporus and Dardanelles and the
demilitarization of the Straits of Korea.(16)
In December 1925, the Soviet Government accepted the invitation
of the Secretary General of the League of Nations to a disarmament
conference by stating disarmament

to be

immediate task of all Governments.' (17)

'the most serious and
In November 1927, Maxim

Litvinov, the new Foreign Commissar, revealed his plan for general and
complete disarmament proposing the complete abolition of all armed
forces on land, at sea and in the air.

A detailed draft agreement

was subsequently put forward outlining the four year program of
disarmament and a proposal for international supervision of the
process headed by a commission of control with powers for 'full
investigation of all activities of the state, of public associations
and of private persons which are connected with the applications of
disarmament.'

(18)

Ihis was a more definite application of the

principles of investigation set forth in the Protocol of Geneva of
1924, although the USSR was not a party to the Protocol.

The Soviet

Union's proposal was set out in five chapters and included sixty-three
articles.

However, it was rejected as unworkable. This was the first

of many such proposals to the League of Nations during the interwar
years.

16
Revolution and Disarmament?

The Soviet struggle for peace and disarmament can be primarily
explained by the recognition of the USSR's relative weakness in the
international system at that time.

Domestic economic concerns also

played an influential part in pursuit of disarmament objectives.

The

survival of the infant Bolshevik regime was very much in doubt.
In 1917, Lenin had said,
So much depends on the question of whether we are
able to delay the war with the capitalist world, which is
inevitable, but which can be delayed, until the proletarian
revolution in Europe has ripened or until the colonial
revolutions are fully ripe, or finally until the capitalists
fight amongst themselves for shares in the colonies. (19)
Lenin believed that there would be revolutions across Europe
following World War One, but by 1920 he spoke of the necessity of
understanding that the revolutionary tide had temporarily subsided in
Europe and that the USSR must 'stand alone.'

(20)

Due to the

collapse of the German revolution and the weakness of the new Soviet
regime, a peace treaty would, in the short-term, grant the Soviet
Union breathing space to develop their own forces and enhance the
security of the regime in the face of foreign hostility.

The policy

was a means of self- defence aiming to restore peace to the Western
front and establishing demilitarized zones along its borders.
Domestic weakness and the dissipation of revolutionary forces
throughout Europe led to the adoption of a modified foreign policy in
1921. Positive pursuit of a disarmament policy coincided with the
transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the same year.

This

was the response to the economic weakness which had to be overcome if
socialism was to survive.

In addition to the favorable trade
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relations expected to be made with capitalist states through contact
at negotiations, Soviet leaders spoke of the need to transfer the men
and resources of the Red Army to more productive pursuits.

In March

1922, M. Frunze, Deputy Commissar of War, proposed to the Congress of
Soviets a 25% reduction of the army. This manpower would become a
Militia whilst employed in industry.

(21)

In June 1922, the Moscow

Disarmament Conference convened and was attended by Estonia, Poland
and Finland. Maxim Litvinov, Foreign Commissar Tchicherin*s Deputy at
that time, proposed a reciprocal 25% force reduction.

The other

parties did not agree to this and did so by calling for an initial
political disarmament, what they called 'moral disarmament.' (22)
Despite failing to reach agreement at the Moscow Conference, the
Red Army was reduced by 25% in February 1923.

Lenin had used the

negotiations as a means of pressuring the USSR's East European
neighbors to make the same kinds of manpower reductions already
planned for the Red Army.

In such a manner, he recognized the

practical utility of disarmament negotiations as a means of promoting
both national security and economic development.

Disarmament policy

gave the Soviet Union a breathing space in which to increase her
relative power, forestall another war and induce the capitalist camp
to reduce its forces.
W.C. Clemens argues that the main aim of the Soviet 'peace
offensive* at this time was political.

It was intended to keep

capitalism divided and off-balance whilst demonstrating to the masses
the impossibility of disarmament under capitalism, and consequently
the need for a Communist revolution.

(23)

It was an attack on the

counter-revolutionary forces in the West not possible by other means.
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By championing the issues of peace and disarmament, Lenin's longer
term aim was to 'isolate the pacifist wing of the bourgeois camp from
the whole of their camp.'

(24)

Disarmament negotiations were

conducted, and the tone and content of proposals were presented to
Western powers so that rejection was guaranteed.

Thus, these were

intended to sow the seeds of revolution by exposing capitalist
governments

as

militaristic

and

leading

one

to conclude

that

disarmament was impossible without the victory of the proletarian
revolution.

In this way, Soviet policy could be seen as a new tactic

in a grand strategy - defensive in the short term and offensive in the
long term - of protecting and promoting the USSR's relatively weak
power in a threatening world arena and as a continuation of the
revolutionary struggle by other means.

(25)

Disarmament policy was also undoubtedly used as a means of
promoting the Soviet Union as a champion of peace, as a form of
propaganda.

All Soviet negotiations conducted and proposals presented

since the foundation of the Soviet state have had these aspects to
them.

Whilst this led some Western analysts to conclude that all

Soviet proposals and negotiations are intended for their propaganda
value and enhancement of prestige alone, this does not explain shifts
in Soviet policy orientation and changes in the propensity to conclude
agreements.
Soviet policy can also be seen as part of a long term Utopian
ideal to the Soviet leadership.

In 1922, Lenin modified his view on

the inevitability of violent conflict with capitalism. Whilst engaged
in disarmament and arms control negotiations with Western countries in
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Genoa, Lausanne and Moscow, he saw agreement, particularly at Genoa,

one of the few chances for the peaceful evolution of
capitalism to a new structure, an event which we as
communists have little faith in, but are willing to help
test. (26)
This provided the basis for a modification of Leninist doctrine
in the 1950s with Khrushchev's 'Peaceful Coexistence' as the USSR
entered the nuclear era.

Indeed, Lenin was disturbed by the rapid

rate of advancement in military technology and confided in his wife in
1918:
contemporary technology is now more and more
increasing the destructive character of war. But the time
will come when war will become so destructive that it will in
general become impossible.
She stated that it was evident how passionately he wanted war to
become impossible.

(27)

In an interview with H.G. Wells in 1920,

Lenin reportedly said:
if we are able to establish interplanetary connections,
the potentiality of technology - having become unlimited
- will put an end to force as a method of progress.(28)
It is clear, however, that disarmament during this time was not a
feasible policy objective for the USSR but rather a short term
defensive tactic and as such, shared many features with Tsarist
policy. This view was shared by A.W. Rudziziski:
Soviet peace policy, like that of Tsarist Russia in
the 1890s, was necessitated by the clear realization of the
weakness and vulnerability of the country and of the Soviet
system and was intended for the protection of the experiment
of 'socialism' in one country. (29)

CHATTER n
THE STALIN YEARS

Serious pursuit of arms limitation agreements was a low priority
for the Soviet Union during the Stalin period.

Only during the years

1928-34 can feasible contemplation of this issue be said to be a
feature of Soviet foreign policy.

Ihe twenty five years of Stalinist

dictatorship was overshadowed by World War II, the events leading up
to it and its aftermath.

Such disruption and tension in the world

order left little scope for arms limitation to be viewed as a policy
of utility and value. Military capability had to be relied upon above
all things.

Two questions must therefore be answered:

first, what

motivated Soviet arms limitation policy up to 1934, and second, what
factors account for disinterest in this policy after 1934.

A brief

examination of arms limitation agreements and additional Soviet
proposals will provide a background to the central issues under
review.
Ihe disarmament and arms limitation policies of the Soviet
Government were conducted up to 1939 by Foreign Commissar Maxim
Litvinov. He had proposed a plan for general and complete disarmament
at the League of Nations Preparatory Commission on disarmament in
1927. This was followed by modified proposals for partial disarmament
in 1928.

This was the basis for his assertion that the Soviet Union

had ’proposed the most radical forms of disarmament. *

(1)

These

plans were developed with more detail at the League of Nations World
Disarmament Conference in 1932, where Litvinov
20
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proposed disarmament on a ’progressive - proportional* principle:
multilateral

force levels would be maintained in relation to each

other at each stage of disarmament. Therefore, no nation would feel
disadvantaged during the arms cutting process.

The substance and

wording of these proposals bear a surprising resemblance to those of
the Tsarist Minister Count Mouraviev at the first Hague Conference of
1899.

However, the main and consistent Soviet orientation was toward

total disarmament.

Proposals from other states in the negotiating

forums were rejected by the USSR because they did not resolve to go
far enough toward that end.

(2)

By 1934, it was clear that Hitler*s Germany would accept no
meaningful agreement at the conference. In an unsuccessful attempt to
salvage something from the meeting, Litvinov proposed to transform it
into a permanent and regularly assembling ’Conference of Peace. * (3)
There was no success in the field of general arms limitation.
However, there were two successes with specific agreements.

The

first was in March 1931 with the Soviet-Turkish Protocol on Limitation
of Naval Armaments establishing a mutual neutrality between the two
nations and maintenance of their Black Sea fleets at existing levels.
In the protocol, the Soviet Government restated its conviction that
*the only reliable guarantee of permanent peace is the effective
reduction of all kinds of existing armaments.*

(4)

This was

consistent with the pervading belief that the outbreak of World War
One was due to the race in armaments and the atmosphere of rivalry and
mistrust it created.

In July 1937, the USSR signed a treaty with

Britain limiting naval armaments and committing the two nations to
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exchange information concerning naval construction. This extended the
London Naval Treaty, of 1936 to the USSR.

The treaty emphasized

qualitative restrictions and bound the Soviet Union to a six year
'holiday', on the construction of cruisers.

It did not hold effect for

long as it included an 'escape clause' for the maintenance of Soviet
naval levels with the Japanese who had withdrawn from the Washington
Naval Agreement of 1922 and were embarking upon a major construction
program.
Together with Britain and the United States, the USSR was party
to the Moscow Declaration of 1943 which, among other things, addressed
the issue of disarmament following conclusion of the war.
powers hoped

These

to establish and maintain international peace and

security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic
resources for armaments.

They were also 'to confer and cooperate to

bring about a practical general agreement with respect to the
regulation of armaments in the postwar period.' (5)
The Soviet Government issued the Moscow Communique in December
1945.

This called for the control of atomic energy for peaceful

purposes, the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons
and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means.(6)
This was agreed to by the US and adopted by the United Nations,
established earlier that year, but this was the last time that the US
and USSR agreed on disarmament matters for over a decade.
In June 1946, the US proposed the Baruch Plan for the control of
atomic energy and the elimination of atomic weapons.

Five days later,

Andrei Gromyko, then a Deputy Foreign Minister, put forward a Soviet
plan which called for the immediate destruction of atomic weapons with
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the means for ensuring verification to be a secondary question.

The

Baruch Plan and ensuing Western proposals emphasized establishment of
institutions of control as the first step to the eventual elimination
of atomic weapons.

In October 1948, the USSR made a concession to the

effect that atomic weapons be prohibited simultaneously with the
introduction of institutions of control.

In reality, there would have

been a time lag before controls would become effective.

(7) The UN

adopted the Baruch Plan but Soviet intransigence held up all UN
attempts to deal with the question and their opposition forestalled
other attempts to reach agreement on conventional force reductions.
It was during this time that the Soviet Union consolidated its
position of dominance in Eastern Europe.
In October 1946, the USSR proposed a general reduction of arms
including conventional weapons and called for a commission on control
of these weapons.

The resolution was passed unanimously

by the UN

but no progress was made on implementation of the resolution.

In

December 1949, the USSR proposed a one third reduction in all armed
forces and armament levels but this was rejected by the West because
Soviet force levels were believed to be well in excess of their own in
the European theater.

In January 1952,

the USSR opposed the

establishment of a UN Disarmament Commission, repeated their proposal
to simultaneously prohibit atomic weapons and establish institutions
of control, and called for a percentage cut in conventional forces.
Joseph Nogee summed up the Western view stating that, by this time, it
was clear that the Soviet delegation did not have a serious interest
in reaching any kind of agreement as they ’refused proposals supported
by the majority view and did not put forward any viable alternatives.1

(8 )
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Behind the Proposals

Clearer than any other period of Soviet history, the 25 years of
Stalinist rule were ones of dictatorship.

Stalin dominated and

directed the formulation of the domestic and foreign policies of the
USSR through the most threatening time in its history. The political
and military

environment

beyond

the

reaches of

profoundly affected the formulation of these policies.

Stalin's

rule

Changes in the

international situation, particularly in 1933-34, can be seen to have
altered the value placed on pursuit of arms limitation policies by the
USSR in the pre-World War II period.
Lenin's position after 1920 had been pragmatic.

He would help

test the feasibility of the peaceful transformation of capitalism.
Soviet involvement in disarmament negotiations from the early twenties
was taken seriously, and the process of negotiation begun then
culminated in Foreign Minister Litvinov's proposals at the Geneva
Conference of

1932-34

for

'progressive - proportional'

disarmament
principle.

to be undertaken

on a

This was an extremely

significant point in the evolution of Soviet disarmament policy as it
was the first time that the Soviet Government expressed willingness to
accept realistic measures for the reduction of armaments as a first
step to its stated aim of general and complete disarmament, an
objective rooted in the tenets of Marxism - Leninism.

It was this

concession which differentiates the Soviet position on talks from 1928
to 1934 from that of the post 1945 period. In the broadest terms, one
can hypothesize that any shift away from the uncorapromizing call for
general and complete disarmament in the short term by the USSR reveals
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a relative seriousness of intent to advance negotiations for the
realization of arms limitation.

This was the case from 1932-34 and

was in contrast to the negotiations held after 1945 and prior to
Stalin*s death in 1953.
Litvinov had submitted a practical concession to the Geneva
Conference, but at home in the Soviet Union, the hard- line ideology
adopted by Stalin as he consolidated power offered very limited room
for such practicalities and allowed little scope for optimism in the
field of armament reduction as viewed from the West. Ihis hard-line
attitude back in Moscow can be illustrated by a statement from the
Sixth Congress of the Communist International of 1928:
It goes without saying that not a single Communist thought
for a moment that the imperialist world would accept the
Soviet disarmament proposals. (9)
Indeed, the view at this time was so uncompromizing that it was
admitted outright that the aim of Soviet proposals was not to spread
pacifist illusions, but *to destroy them.*

(10). Stalin himself held

a cynical view towards the ability of treaties and agreements to
forestall conflict.

In 1925 he had said:

From the history of Europe, we know that every time
treaties are concluded concerning the alignment of forces
for a new war, these treaties are called treaties for peace.

(id
Up to 1934, the Soviet leadership hoped for and awaited a wave of
revolutions in Western Europe which would avert a direct clash with
imperialism.

These did not take place.

Stalin modified Marxist -

Leninist logic and formulated his theory of 'socialism in one country'
which

placed

emphasis

on

Soviet

international revolutionary goals.

State

interests

Events were

ahead

of

to prove this
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modification extremely expedient.

Economically and militarily, the

Soviet Union*s priorities became strength and self-sufficiency.
The policy of ’socialism in one country* was

formulated on the

common ground where ideology met the pragmatic imperatives of the
Soviet state.

Stalin realized that the USSR would have to stand alone

and

itself

defend

against

any

external

threat.

Forced

collectivization of agriculture and the rapid development of heavy
industry sought to achieve the goals of economic and military selfsufficiency and strength.
economic power.

Military might was to be based upon

Accompanying the 1928 Five Year Plan was a plan for

the development of the Red Army.

Targetsfor army strength

were

revised upwards in 1929 and 1931 - the aim being that the Red Army
would have no fewer troops than potential enemies and would attain
superiority in decisive types of weapons.

(12)

Production of arms

and equipment rose rapidly from 1928 to 1933 as Stalin aimed to catch
up with and overtake the capitalist states.

(13)

In light ofthis,

how can the increasing militarization of the USSR be reconciled with
serious efforts to conclude arms limitation treaties prior to 1934?
The policy of self reliance was compatible with pursuit of an
active disarmament policy up to 1934.

In the aftermath of World War

One, the view persisted that armaments were a primary cause of
international hostility.

Litvinov realized that a new conflict in

Europe was impending and threatened unprecedented devastation. At the
World Disarmament Conference of 1932, he stated:
the task of the hour is not the repetition of any
attempts to achieve some reduction of armaments or war
budgets...but the actual prevention of war. This task can
only be carried out by means of total and general
disarmament. (14)
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As mentioned above, the Soviet Government was willing to accept
partial measures of disarmament and proposed their own progressive proportional plan.
increasing

By 1934, this approach was obsolete due to the

militarism of

suggestion that

Nazi

Germany

and Japan.

Litvinov's

the Conference be transformed into a regularly

assembling 'Conference of Peace' was an attempt to establish an
instrument for the amelioration of international tensions.
Consistent with the Tsarist regime of Nicholas II and the first
years of the Soviet State, the Soviet Government throughout this
period was fearful and suspicious of the superior military powers
which threatened its borders.

Also, it was sensitive to the USSR's

economic and technological backwardness.

Stalin's polices aimed to

deal with these factors in unison whilst Litvinov strove for peace
through negotiation in the face of the menace confronting the world
order.

Litvinov expressed Soviet fear at the League of Nations

preparatory commission for Disarmament in March of 1928:
Of all the countries represented here, the Soviet is
the most threatened. It is the object of hostility and illfeeling on the part of the whole bourgeois world. Its
enemies are legion, its friends few. (15)
Perception of ideological hostility changed to one of direct military
menace from Germany and Japan after 1933.
For the remainder of the 1930s, the USSR pursued alternative
diplomatic policies designed to maintain the status quo and postpone
an armed conflict with the forces of capitalism.

In September 1934,

the Soviet Union entered the system of collective security by joining
the League of Nations.

In 1935, the USSR hoped to offset the German

threat by concluding treaties of mutual defence with France and
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Czechoslovakia.

The naval treaty with Britain in 1937 maintained

relative naval levels not only with Britain but also Germany, as these
two nations signed a similar agreement at the same time. Thus, the
European naval status quo was reinforced.
In order to fortify Soviet neutrality and to give the USSR
breathing space to build up its own forces, Foreign Ministers Molotov
and Ribbentrop concluded a Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in August
1939. This was followed by a neutrality act with Japan in April 1941.
These pacts may have been necessitated by Soviet unpreparedness for
conflict, especially in light of the massive purges of military
officers in 1938.

It may be the case that Stalin did not intend to

wipe out his officer corps on the eve of war.
the purges acquired a momentum of their own.

Holloway suggests that
(16)

Perhaps the total

surprise with which the German invasion was met suggests that Stalin
believed that he could keep the USSR out of a major war indefinitely.
However viewed, Soviet policy sought to avoid conflict, and pursuit of
disarmament was considered a feasible way to do this before 1934. The
disarmament

policy was

a function of relative Soviet military

inferiority. This inferiority is at the heart of the change in conduct
of Soviet

foreign and disarmament policy

alternative

policies

of

collective

from 1934, when

security,

defence

the

and non

aggression pacts and neutrality acts were pursued more vigorously.
The Gold War,

The US and USSR had much in common in 1945.
isolationist policies in the pre-war period.

They had pursued

They had both been

forced to declare war on their respective enemies due to attacks on
their territory.

They had entered into a close military relationship

29

as allies against Nazi Germany which brought both leaderships into
regular personal contact, and they shared the fruits of victory over
Hitler in Europe.

However, in a matter of months, they were engaged

in what became known as the 'Cold War.'
For the Soviet Union , the repulsion of Nazi troops from Soviet
territory and eventual victory exacted a terrible cost of over twenty
million dead and enormous material destruction of the homeland.

The

development of heavy industry during the 1930s, the mobilization of
the economy during the war, and five years of postwar reconstruction
established an industrial base sufficient to support a modem military
power.

The Red Army occupied the countries of Eastern Europe in

accordance with the Potsdam agreement of 1945.

These countries were

soon consolidated into Soviet satellite states, signalling to the West
that Soviet political, economic and military influence would remain
extended to where it met American, British and French troops in
Western Germany.

Mistrust and suspicion of each other's intentions

led to tension and fear in those conditions and an atmosphere was
created whereby each side could perceive the other's action and aims
as threatening. This was the basis of the 'Cold War.'
The Soviet Union considered itself to be the leader of all'
progressive forces' in the World in 1946.

(17)

Stalin attempted to

force West Berlin into the Soviet camp with an unsuccessful blockade
in 1949, and in the same year a new regime friendly to the USSR was
established in China under Mao Zedong.

In 1950 the Soviet Union

backed forces of North Korea came into conflict with an allied force
led by the American array supporting the maintenance of a US-backed
Government in the south of the country.
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These actions, coupled with a profound distaste of communism,
gave substance to American perceptions of the Soviet Union as a threat
to the world order established in 1945,
quite different.

Soviet perceptions were

By creating a buffer zone in Eastern Europe and

keeping Germany divided, traditional enemies and invasion routes would
lose much of their former menace.

This security was seen to be

threatened by the massive post-war American aid of the Marshall Plan
to Western Europe, particularly Germany.
the creation of a
attempt

to

keep

Efforts, by the US to prevent

buffer zone were viewed by Soviet leaders as an
their

country weak.

(18)

Politically and

economically, the Truman Doctrine expressed US intentions to contain
Soviet influence.

Thus, the Soviet Union emerged from the war being

forced to contemplate the hostility of the world's most powerful
nations.

Consequently, Soviet leaders felt it necessary to strengthen

their strategic position in view of their relative inferiority
compared to states more economically and technologically advanced.
The same old story but a very new era.
Symbolizing American preeminence as the most powerful nation in
the world following World War II was a monopoly on atomic weapons
technology.

Stalin denied that this technology was revolutionary.

In

October 1946, he told a Western correspondent:
I do not consider the atomic bomb such a serious force
as some politicians are inclined to think. Atomic bombs are
intended to frighten the weak nerved. (19)
Stalin clearly wanted the west to think that the USSR's strategic
thinking was unaffected by the advances in technology.
American use of this technology on Japan was viewed as an attempt
to put pressure on the USSR

and remind them of their technological
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and military inferiority.

(20)

Stalin directed resources to develop

a Soviet bomb as early as 1943.

Molotov stated in November 1945 that

the Soviet Union 'must equal the achievements of contemporary world
technology...we will have atomic energy and much else.' (21)
Between 1947 and 1953, there were no articles published in the USSR on
either

atomic

energy

or

weapons

because

recognition

of

the

significance of the technology would have affected public and military
morale and would have acknowledged US success at intimidation.

(22)

The first Soviet bomb was tested in 1949 but the rocket technology to
deliver these weapons to the US was not developed until 1957.

The US

could launch bombers armed with nuclear weapons in Western Europe to
attack the USSR, whereas, the USSR did not possess a bomber force
capable of striking the key strategic areas of the US.
Implications for arms limitation were obvious. Whilst the US had
a monopoly on

this

technology,

any agreement

to ban

further

development as proposed in the Baruch Plan would ensure that this
monopoly was maintained.

The USSR was adamantly opposed to giving up

the opportunity to develop their own weaponry of this sort. This they
would forego if all US weapons were destroyed immediately.
The Soviet leadership did not perceive the same threat as did the
West in uncontrolled national atomic industries and protested all
attempted

'infringements of national sovereignty' which proposed

institutions of control in the Baruch Plan were seen to be.

(23)

Negotiating positions revealed a complete lack of interest in reaching
any sort of agreement which, if signed, would lock-in Soviet strategic
inferiority so long as nuclear weapons belonged solely to the
Americans. Stalin had not been consulted during the war about the
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development and use of the bomb and thus saw no grounds for trust in
the postwar suggestions to establish international control over the
development and use of atomic energy,

(24)

Why then did the Soviet

Union negotiate at all?
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 provided a focus
for world opinion on the grave issue of atomic energy.

The

representatives of the USSR at the UN sought to court opinion by
presenting their country as the champion of peace and security as they
had done in the twenties and thirties.

Up to 1949, the USSR was

opposed to atomic weapons and presented proposals calling for their
immediate abolition.

After 1949, it emphasized the peaceful uses to

which atomic energy could be applied.
By forcing the Western powers to reject as many Soviet proposals
as possible, the utility of negotiations as a propaganda weapon could
be maximized, and in contrast to the pacifist rhetoric of the USSR,
the US would be viewed as an aggressive nation.

Negotiations to

control the development and proliferation of atomic energy became a
'propaganda
opinion,

football'

of

sufficient salience

and not only within the UN.

(25)

to mobilize world
In 1950 the USSR

sponsored a World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Stockholm which
appealed for a ban on nuclear weapons before the emplacement of
international controls.

Coincidentally, this was the Soviet position

at the UN.(26)
Active engagement in negotiations at the UN was far more than a
propaganda exercise.

The USSR was still acutely vulnerable to the US

atomic capability whilst developing its own.

By nurturing an image of

a pacifist power, it was hoped that the will of the US Government and
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general public to actually use the bomb on the USSR would be weakened.
(27)
Negotiations were also a means whereby the USSR could stall for
time before its own bomb was developed whilst at the same time
appearing to contribute to the process of building a safer post-war
order. The explosion of the first atomic device in September 1949 did
not mark any sharp change in the tone of negotiations.

They were

overshadowed by the intensity of the Cold War which reached its peak
at this time.

Soviet and American negotiators did not even meet

socially during the course of the talks.

(28)

Introduction of atomic weapons into the Soviet arsenal did not
alter Stalin's 'Permanently Operating Factors* of strategic doctrine.
All talk of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons was banned.
Military thought was regarded as 'the prerogative of the 'leader of
genius* and not subject to elaboration on a lower level.* (29)
elaboration had to wait until after Stalin's death in 1953.

This
It was

during the Khrushchev era that development of a Soviet nuclear
doctrine and recognition of the consequences of nuclear war took
place.

Coincidental with

these changes was a more favorable

disposition to arms limitation.

As for Stalin's era, the

harsh

military realities of a perceived strategic and military inferiority
left policies for disarmament with only peripheral value in general to
Soviet foreign policy, despite enormous increases in economic power
and military capabilities.

CHAPTER 3
THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS 1953-1964

Soviet proposals for arras control measures became identifiably
more serious following the death of Stalin in 1953 and the explosion
of the USSR’s first thermonuclear device a few months later.

There

were two main diplomatic successes during this period. These were the
Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the installation of the so called
’Hot Line' between the Kremlin and Washington. Both were symbols of a
new detente between the superpowers and the first steps toward more
comprehensive arms control agreements in the following years.

It was

during this decade that Soviet policy evolved to encompass the notion
of managing rather than eliminating the arms race.

Whilst the USSR

still predominantly relied on its own military capabilities for
national security, the nature of its military-strategic and technical
inferiority in relation to the US underwent an enormous qualitative
change.

This resulted in profound alterations to Soviet strategic

doctrine and the prevailing ideology of Khrushchev's leadership.
Recognition of the 'military-technical revolution' which had taken
place since the introduction of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of
the superpowers provided the impetus and justification for the
formulation and pursuit of the general Soviet foreign policy of
'Peaceful Coexistence'.

Soviet leaders were forced to realize that

open conflict with capitalism would result in a catastrophically
destructive nuclear war, the consequences of which were clearly spelt
out on numerous occasions - Soviet security was to be best served by
avoiding nuclear war.
34
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Arms control and detente policies acquired a new prominence and
became high priorities for the USSR in accordance with the imperatives
of the nuclear age. Khrushchev told the 1956 Party Congress that war
with the Capitalist West was no longer ‘fatalistically inevitable.*
This was his message to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October
31st, 1959:
It is now clear that it is possible to solve the
problems confronting the world only if one acts not from a
position of strength but from a position of reason. These
questions must be solved with the aid of the only sensible
method, the method of negotiation. (1)
During this period, arms control negotiations took place on two
broad fronts. The Soviet Union became the second member of the nuclear
club in 1949 and moves toward Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties
can be seen as an attempt to defend this position. Negotiations with
the United States on control of the race in arms can be sub-divided
into those dealing with explosives and those dealing with delivery
vehicles.

The USSR first developed its nuclear explosive capability

in 1949 but did not acquire the means to deliver weapons to the US
until 1957.
I will firstly deal with Soviet proposals for control of
explosives and delivery vehicles in negotiations from 1953-64.
In the years following Stalin*s death, particularly in the Spring
of 1955, there was a fundamental change in outlook with evidence that
proposals were put forward with 'seriousness of purpose1 and apparent
feasibility.
several

(2) The USSR announced a series of concessions which in

important

instances

represented

a

clear

acceptance

of

positions that for some years had been vainly advocated by the Western
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powers.

Behavior suggested at least the possibility that Moscow

sought to bridge the gap with the Western position.

The style of

Soviet disarmament diplomacy became more conciliatory and less
evasive, a definite shift away from Stalin*s sweeping and immediate
measures.

The Soviet leadership appeared to accept the Western

concept of comprehensive disarmament in stages and showed interest in
partial measures to safeguard peace and curb the arms race in line
with the precedent set by Litvinov in 1932.
Briefly, Soviet proposals on controls and force levels were as
follows:

On September 30th 1954, they accepted proposals for a two-

phase cut in conventional arms in one year with nuclear prohibition
during the second phase.

On May 10th, 1955, they proposed ground

control posts to guard against surprise attack, listed objects of
control and admitted that past nuclear production could not be
controlled.

On three occasions they renounced the use of nuclear

weapons - first on the 21st July, 1955, second, on 10th November 1955,
and third on 7th March, 1956.

(3)

The major Soviet arms control

proposal in 1956 was made on March 27th and was significant for its
explicit advocacy of a ’partial measures* approach.

(4)

It was a

move from disarmament to arms control as the overriding objective of
negotiations.
These proposals and the negotiations in which they were presented
did not end in any sort of agreement.

Throughout the discussions,

neither side addressed itself directly to the other. B.G. Bechhoeffer
described the process as ’interim sparring.*

(5)

This was not the

case in the period 1957-62, during which the Soviets brought forward
four different versions of comprehensive disarmament dealing with both
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nuclear and conventional weapons, the final stage achieving levels
sufficient
obligations.

for internal security and fulfilment of UN Charter
These proposals were unacceptable to the West in terms

of verification procedures,

timetabling and provisions

for the

elimination of overseas bases in the first or second stage of
disarmament.
Proposals between late 1956 and August 1957 were particularly
striking for the way in which they backed off from the position
endorsed by Moscow in 1955 and 1956 concerning inspection procedures.
Subsequent proposals until 1962 had the structural defect of proposing
to radically alter the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons.
In 1959, Khrushchev proposed to the UN to put off nuclear disarmament
until the third stage of general disarmament.

In March 1962 he

changed this priority to destruction of all nuclear delivery systems
in Stage I and all nuclear weapons in Stage II.
Between 1960-62, the USSR displayed some awareness of the need
for an international inspectorate to affirm that conditions were ready
for transition from one stage to another.

In September 1962, it was

recognized to be desirable for the nuclear powers to retain a limited
number of nuclear weapons after the first stage of disarmament.

This

was referred to as the nuclear umbrella scheme.
Agreement was a long way off, as is made clear by Bloomfield:
It can only be concluded that the Soviet position on
general and complete disarmament, even as amended in 1962, was
primarily designed for its propaganda effect rather than for
its negotiability. (6)
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By raid-1961, the optimistic outlook that underlay the shift in Soviet
arras control policy in 1954-56 had been eroded.
At this time, the focus of negotiations shifted to a ban on
tests. The Soviet Union had addressed this issue earlier.

In 1956,

they undertook a major drive for test cessation, proposing it on three
occasions;

12th July, 11th September and 17th October.

One month

later, they accepted the notion of aerial inspection in Europe but
little progress was made because the talks were overtaken by events in
Hungary, where Soviet troops quelled a nationalist uprising.
From 1959, the time of the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union
and subsequently

the United States announced a series of test

raoratoria but actual agreement on the banning of tests was some way
off. On August 29th and September 3rd, 1962, the Soviet delegate to
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his
government's willingness to sign a three-environment test ban with a
moratorium on underground testing while continuing negotiations on the
final prohibition of such explosions.

On December 19th, Khrushchev

announced that the Soviet Union would accept 'two to three' on-site
inspections per year for the control on a comprehensive test ban
treaty.

Moscow also began negotiating a direct communication link -

the 'Hot Line' - with Washington.

Progress was made on April 5th,

1963, when the Soviet delegate agreed to the US proposals for a link.
Agreement was reached on June 20th, 1963.
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On June 10th, it was announced that a 'high-level* conference
would take place between the US, UK

and USSR on July 15th.

On July

2nd, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet government was interested in
concluding a partial test ban treaty and called for the simultaneous
signing

of

an

East-West

non-aggression

pact.

This

was

not

forthcoming, but on August 5th, 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was
signed prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, on land and in
the sea. L. Freedman considers this to be the 'first serious arms
control measure.' (7)
Later in 1963, the USSR accepted safeguards to ensure that
fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes by
aid recipients at the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference.
Also, at the UN, the USSR joined with the US in an agreement on
certain legal principles covering the exploration and use of outer
space.

Finally, on April 20th, 1964, the US, UK and USSR unilaterally

pledged to cut back production of fissionable materials.
To summarize, three distinct phases can be seen in the Soviet
position during the Khrushchev era:

The period 1954-57 can be

characterized as a genuine and radical shift toward establishing
common ground with the West's position. The period 1958-62 was an
interruption of this movement, though not in terms of testing. The
1962-64 period was notable for the successes achieved in reaching
agreement • At this point, it is necessary to establish the reasons
explaining why agreement was not reached before this time. Answers lie
in the Soviet quest for national security by its own efforts with arms
control policies subordinate to and a function of strategic concerns.
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characterized as a genuine and radical shift toward establishing
common ground with the West’s position.
The Strategic Balance

Entry into the nuclear era did not alter the fact that the Soviet
leadership was still acutely aware of their strategic inferiority and
vulnerability in relation to the US.

During the 1954-56 period, the

USSR had achieved substantial progress toward a credible minimum
deterrent and future developments, especially in the missile field,
looked even more promising.

Such an outlook did not enhance

the

possibilities of reaching limited arms control agreements as this
might have prematurely restricted Soviet freedom of action.
With the development of two strategic bombers, the TU-95 and the
M-4, the USSR concentrated on emphasizing to the West that they now
had a capability to deliver the nuclear weapons which had
developed.
Washington.
advancing

been

This triggered the ’bomber gap* debates of Mid-1955 in
This was also a time when the Soviets were rapidly
their missile

and

space

programs,

culminating

in a

successful firing of a multi-stage intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) in August 1957 and the
1957.

launching of Sputnik 1 on October6th,

The consensus of both East and West was that the USSR

was

moving into a position of military parity with the West and would
perhaps soon surpass the West in some respects.

This prospect was

greeted with alarm and dispondency in the US as the ’bomber gap*
debates turned into ’missile gap* panic.

Some elements in the US Air

Force suggested acting against the USSR ’before it’s too late.* (8)
With regard to disarmament proposals during this period, it is
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doubtful whether the comprehensive plans espoused by the USSR were
viewed by the Soviet. Union’s leadership as constituting a net gain if
accepted.
(9)

Consequently, these plans were propounded with caution.

In contrast,

explosives,

’partial measures for disarmament* in terms of

not delivery vehicles,

appeared

to receive serious

attention from the Soviet leadership at this time with agreements on
many aspects to be reached finally in 1963-64.

The USSR was more

confident of its longer range ability to negotiate with the West on
favorable terms once ICBMs became part of its military inventory.
From 1957 to 1960/61, Khrushchev was confident that the Soviet
Union's military capabilities would be seen to be the equal or better
of those in the West.

He attempted to gain political benefit from

this apparent development with much emphasis placed on ICBMs in his
rhetoric at this time.

It was a 'single-minded devotion to this

particular weapon* for which he was criticized after his removal from
office.

(10)

So confident was he in the new military capability of

the USSR that he bragged in 1960 that 'in view of the growth of
Socialism and the forces of peace, the correlation of forces in the
international arena has shaped up unfavorably for imperialism.' (11)
In striking contrast to this perception of Soviet power, the USSR
pursued a policy for a General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) at this
time.

It is clear that this was primarily designed for it's

propaganda effect rather than as a serious basis for negotiation.
Spanier and Nogee argued in 1962 that 'the Soviet Union has no serious
interest in disarmament or even in limiting the arms race but utilizes
the disarmament negotiations solely for propaganda purposes.' (12) As
Alexander Dallin points out,

'the very process of negotiating -
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whether culminating in agreement or not - bears political dividends by
strengthening an image of the Soviet Union as the champion of peace
and disarmament.* (13)

This peace-loving image was designed to be

projected to the West, the developing nations and to the Soviet
population itself.
The GCD plan also reflected a reaction to criticism from the
Chinese who held the orthodox position that partial measures were an
unacceptable accommodation with Capitalism.

It can also be seen as

part of a diplomatic tradition going back to the 1920s and an aspect
of the ideological propensity for total solutions.
Bechhoeffer suggests that the Soviet leadership was seeking the
best of all possible worlds by pursuing a *two-pronged* approach - one
prong attempting to gain the political advantages of advocating an
idealistic program of drastic disarmament, the other working toward
partial measures which might be capable of immediate negotiation. (14)
Bearing in mind the growing military, economic and political
power of the USSR at this time, Khrushchev's attitude toward the
threats inherent in the nuclear era centered on the threat of
accidental war:
The position in the world today is a dangerous one
.... The world has reached a point where war could become
a fact owing to some stupid accident, such as a technical
fault in a plane carrying a hydrogen bomb or a mental
aberration in the pilot behind the controls. (15)
In his memoirs he states that 'any damn fool can start a war, and once
he's done so, even the wisest of men are helpless to stop it —
especially if it's a nuclear war.*

(16)

Partial measures included in the GCD plan sought to address this
problem by reducing border tensions wherever the 'spark* that sets off
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war might be generated.

An additional concern addressed was fear of

surprise or pre-emptive attack.

Khrushchev proposed a non-aggression

pact with NATO and offered agreement on the prevention of surprise
attack by one state upon another.
In 1961, it became evident that the missile gap was in America's
favor.

Failings in the Soviet economy also undermined confidence in

Socialism's ultimate victory.

The Berlin Crisis of October 1961

concentrated the attention of both the US and USSR on the danger of
deterrence failing.

Khrushchev was aware of the Soviet Union's

relative strategic inferiority and hence, the credible ability to
deter Western attack. He was forced to a number of expedients.
First, he emphasized the threat to the members of NATO more
easily reached and destroyed than the US:
If war is launched with present-day weapons, it
threatens literally catastrophic consequences for the people.
While this policy is dangerous for all countries it is even
more hazardous for countries like Britain, France and West
Germany, with high population densities and relatively small
areas. The Governments of these countries are risking the
complete annihilation of every living thing on their
territory. (17)
Second, he emphasized the ferocity of the explosions of each warhead
rather than the number of individual explosions.

This was a counter

to the US belief that war, if it came, would be one of controlled
escalation.
The third rapid solution attempted by Khrushchev was to place
medium-range missiles in Cuba in October 1962:
The US had already surrounded the Soviet Union with
its own bomber bases and missiles. We knew that American
missiles were aimed at us in Turkey and Italy, to say
nothing of West Germany. As Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, I found myself in the position of having to
decide on a course of action which would answer the American
threat, but which would also avoid war.... In addition to
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protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the
West likes to call 'the balance of power. (18)
As Richard Lowenthal

pointed out at the time,

the Cuban missile

venture provided a striking illustration of the choice between
conflict and collaboration that the erosion of alternatives appeared
to have forced upon Khrushchev.

(19)

The US detected the missiles

before they were installed and forced an 'ignominious' climb-down by
Khrushchev.
Crucial for the conduct of Soviet policy, the crisis confirmed
publicly the Soviet comparative strategic inferiority.
superpowers had been

brought to the brink of

The two

disaster and were

consequently stimulated to explore ways of thawing the 'Cold War'.
One tangible result of this crisis was the establishment of the HotLine link between Washington and Moscow. Moscow had resigned itself
for the time being to reliance on a minimum deterrent considerably
smaller than the US strategic might.

Soviet interest in arms control

measures governing testing reached a high point for the decade.
The Threat from Third Parties

Other strategic concerns reinforced the Soviet desire to achieve
agreement on 'partial measures.' The first of these was an intrinsic
Soviet fear of the

rise of Germany following

the bitterness of

conflict during World

War II. Whilst the US expressed a fear of a

'nuclear Pearl Harbor,' it is the Soviet experience of invasion from
the West which they wished to ensure would not be repeated.
Within the GCD plan, the USSR wished to see the establishment
of an 'atomic-free' zone in central Europe.

The need for a political

settlement in Europe was reflected in the explicit desire to stop
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Germany from becoming a nuclear power.

In addition, it would open up

the way to the political gain of dividing NATO.
policies

proposed neutralize

germany's

Not only would the

future military-political

potential; they would also achieve another major objective of Soviet
policy, the removal or at least retraction of the US military presence
from along the perimeter of the USSR and its allies.
Another

strategic consideration of

significant and growing

influence was the ideological rift with the Chinese. The People's Army
of Mao's China also became a military threat to Soviet territory in
Asia gained before the Bolshevik revolution.

China requested that

this territory be returned.

Coincidental with an

The USSR refused.

ideological rift, the Chinese invaded across the Massala River in 1961
and inflicted heavy casualties before being repelled.

Since that

time, approximately one million Soviet soldiers have been stationed on
the Chinese border and part of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal has been
targeted on China.

The Chinese held to orthodox Marxist-Leninist

doctrine which stated that Capitalism would not perish without war.
Disarmament would
liberation.

harm the possibilities

of supporting wars of

In 1960, Khrushchev attacked Mao for knowing little of

the realities of the modern world or the dangers of thermonuclear war.

(20)
Following the Cuban missile crisis, open enmity existed between
Peking and Moscow.The Chinese accused the
of nuclear weapons.

USSR of making a 'fetish'

They did not share the view that nuclear weapons

qualitatively changed the nature of war.
With signature of the

Limited Test Ban Treaty, the verbal

conflict reached a new intensity.

The Chinese charged that the pact
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was a result of a plot between the USSR and the imperialists to
preserve a three-nation monopoly of nuclear weapons and to ‘contain*
Communist China#

In this there may have been some truth.

The Soviet

Union justified the pact as part of a step-by-step approach to
disarmament: two important steps in the process were non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons and the campaign to warn the people of the world of
the extent of the *ruins* that a nuclear war would leave behind it.
Whatever motive, the treaty placed obstacles in the path of the
Chinese quest for a nuclear arsenal of its own.
Whilst the ideological and military conflict with China is
consistent with an increased Soviet propensity to conclude agreement
with the US in terms of chronology, its validity as an explanatory
factor in its own right is severely limited by the fact that it cannot
be tested until a significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement takes place.
If this should happen, this hypothesis would hold that the USSR would
become markedly less willing to negotiate and conclude agreements.
It is clear that the global military-strategic factor best
accounts for both the stability and fluctuations in Soviet policy
toward arms control during the Khrushchev era.

Fixed elements among

The Soviet Union's interests and policies on arms control were the
profound and overriding concern

to avoid general war with its

catastrophic effects and, also, the USSR's acquisition of a credible
minimum deterrent.

The changing balance between Soviet and American

strategic forces appears to have been the 'enabling* condition for
agreement on arms control.

The Cuban episode forced Khrushchev to

accept that national security could not be enhanced through unilateral
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military action.

The US and USSR shared a common interest in reaching

agreement, perhaps more as a symbol of mutual responsibility for world
peace than as a means to address specific questions of armaments.

As

L. Freedman points out, ’the prospect of an all engulfing nuclear war
reminded the superpowers that they should not push their differences
over ideology and geopolitical interests too far .f (21)
1

This was at the core of the shift in Soviet strategic doctrine
and state ideology.

Soviet entry into the nuclear era dictated a new

realism symbolized by the adoption of the policy of

’peaceful

coexistence* - a realism that cannot be explained solely by a broad
definition of military-strategic factors.

One has to look for the

recognition by Soviet leaders that a profound qualitative change had
taken place in the nature of the strategic balance.
Peaceful Coexistence.

Khrushchev’s rival for leadership within the politburo, Malenkov,
was the first Soviet leader to acknowledge realization of the
consequences of open conflict with the West.

In 1954, he stated that

war 'with the contemporary means of warfare means the destruction of
world civilization.’ (22)

However, talk of the destruction of world

civilization was attacked by Molotov and others in the Politburo for
encouraging fatalism and defeatism.

(23)

The official position

evolved to the point where future war was viewed as a retardation
rather than a prevention of the inevitable march toward Communism.
Khrushchev later explained:
War would be a calamity for mankind and would take a heavy
toll of human life and values. But man, nevertheless, would
not perish. Since man would survive, the ideas of MarxismLeninism are immortal. Humanity would rid itself of
Capitalism but the price would be such that there should be
no resort to War. Both the Socialist and Capitalist
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countries would suffer.
by side on one planet.

So we shall just have to live side
(24)

This was the essence of ‘peaceful coexistence1 and became a
clearly stated policy orientation in 1956, by which time Khrushchev
had consolidated his position as undisputed leader.
At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in April 1956, Khrushchev
radically altered the direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy
by denouncing Stalin in a secret speech, and he elaborated on the
policy of peaceful coexistence.

Crucial to the adoption of this

policy was a major reinterpretation

of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Khrushchev stated that war was no longer 'fatalistically inevitable.'
The USSR now had the capability to prevent Capitalism from 'unleashing
war'

but the Soviet leadership was

result in mutual annihilation.

This

aware that nuclear war would
was a change in strategic

thinking, with 'peaceful coexistence* the only alternative to nuclear
war.
The nuclear revolution undermined orthodox Communist doctrine on
the link between war and revolution.

Khrushchev's statements after

1956

the

reflected

thermonuclear war.

the

awareness

of

destructive

nature

of

He persistently argued that the cost of victory in

a showdown between nuclear superpowers would be such as to make the
use of the word 'victory' ludicrous.
Nuclear war would involve the destruction of cities,
factories and plants on an unprecedented scale. It would
mean the deaths of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of
people. Its consequences would be gravely felt in the life
of generations to come .... Now that science has come up
with the means of destruction of unprecedented power, any new
world war would involve untold calamities and suffering for
humanity ..... Must the establishment of the new order on
the ruins of the past be paid for in the blood of hundreds
upon hundreds of millions of people? Is there no other way?
(25)
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B.G.

Bechhoeffer

argued

that

the

’Soviet

realization

of

the

destructive potential of nuclear weapons influenced or even caused the
change of the Soviet emphasis on the inevitability of war.1(26)
This was the doctrinal shift which accounts for the ideological
Sino-Soviet split.

In essence, Khrushchev sought to increase Soviet

security by avoiding nuclear war and setting up survival by avoiding
nuclear war as a prerequisite for all else. On the eve of the Partial
Test Ban Treaty, Chinese Politburo member Liu Shao-Ch’i stated:
In the eyes of modem revisionists, the main
contradiction of our time is between Mankind and nuclear
weapons, between life and death. All class and national
contradictions must now be subordinated to this
contradiction. To survive is everything. The philosophy
of survival has replaced the revolutionary theories of
Marxism-Leninism. (27)
Khrushchev’s reply was to attack the Chinese for being indifferent to
the fate of 'hundreds of millions of people who are doomed to death in
the event of a thermonuclear war' and the ensuing ’destruction of the
values of human civilization.'

(28)

A. Dallin saw this reply as a

'declaration of what critics of Marxism had argued for years:
technological change could override categories and could indeed arrest
historical laws hitherto deemed universal and ineluctable.'

(29)

This was encapsulated in the CPSU’s 'open letter' of July 14th, 1963,
with the statement that 'the atomic bomb does not adhere to the class
principle.' (30)
Soviet policies followed this line and were upheld, explained and
defended by Khrushchev with reference to 'peaceful coexistence.'
Adherence to this political world view naturally tempered Soviet
attitudes and approaches to policies of disarmament and arms control
throughout the Khrushchev era as such policies are derivative of
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general policy orientations and aims.

Bechhoeffer saw that the

practical importance of the change in Soviet ideological emphasis in
the direction of peaceful coexistence was that it resulted after a
short

interval

in

precise

proposals

which

negotiation and translated into a specific program:

permitted

genuine

(31)

Agreement between the two countries (US and USSR)
and between all the great powers on the problem of
disarmament would be welcomed with great satisfaction by
ordinary peoples in all comers of the world and would open
the door for broad cooperation between states and for a
stable ’peaceful coexistence* of all countries and
peoples. (32)
This first manifested itself in Soviet acceptance of the principle of
'partial measures' toward disarmament and initiated a process to this
end in 1957.

However, by 1959 and as a result of the trends which

apparently gave the USSR a strategic superiority due to advances in
ICBM technology, the Soviet position returned to unrealistic and
general programs for complete disarmament - a simple reiteration of
slogans.
Accompanying such slogans were repeated acknowledgment of the
destructive nature of the new weapons being incorporated into the
superpower's arsenals.

R.J. Barnet recognised in early 1961 that the

Soviets were becoming more seriously concerned with the risks of the
arms race.

(33)

An effort was made to reconcile the possibility of

arms control with Marxist ideology.

The Pravda editorial of June

13th, 1960, attacked Party members for refusing to believe in the
'possibility

of

disarmament'

and

discussing

disarmament policy as a 'pacifist illusion.'

the

Government's

Barnet continues: 'this

discussion might suggest that Khrushchev is determined to develop
within the USSR an ideological position that can encompass negotiated
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disarmament.1 One must bear in mind A.B. Ulam's point that Communist
doctrine 'will be stretched to justify any practical needs of policy.1

In order to establish domestic popular support for arms control
measures, Khrushchev reiterated the theme of the mutual annihilation
of war in order to bring this message home to the Soviet people, and
to further underline the Soviet priority of avoiding nuclear war.
The monstrous destructive force of modem nuclear
weapons and the possibility of delivering them to any point
on the globe are such convincing arguments today that man's
reason cannot fail to demand the earliest possible solution
of the problem of disarmament. - Campaign Speech in
Moscow, March 17th, 1962. (35)
Following the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, the superpowers
neared agreement on banning nuclear tests.

Khrushchev felt the need

to reaffirm the justification for such treaties in the light of
intense doctrinal rivalry with the Chinese.

This again was done in

reference to nuclear wars
As for Marxist-Leninists, they cannot propose to
establish a Communist civilization on the ruins of the
centers of world culture, on land laid waste and
contaminated by nuclear fallout.... To use a familiar
phrase, blessed is he who talks about war without knowing
what he is talking about. (36)
The editorial in Kommunist in May 1961 stated:
Peaceful coexistence is one of the forms of the
class struggle in the international scene, a struggle that
is economic, political and ideological. (37)
Following the death of Stalin, the Soviet leadership's reappraisal of
the world situation was based on the assessment of the consequences of
open conflict with Capitalism.

It would mean a devastating nuclear

war; hence the above emphasis on forms of struggle other than
military.

Nuclear weapons had qualitatively altered the nature of the
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strategic balance, but despite the ICBM achievements which put the
USSR ahead of the US, technologically for a while, the military and
economic balance remained firmly in America's favor.

It is to

economic factors that I shall now turn.
The Political Economy of the Arms Race*

As in previous chapters, economic considerations proved to be a
contributory factor accounting for a positive Soviet predisposition to
conclude agreements after which the USSR would be able to cut back
military expenditures.

This would enable the diversion of resources

to meet domestic needs and create an international atmosphere which
would promote bilateral trade.

This was the view of Jules Moch, the

French disarmament negotiator, when he stated in 1954 that the USSR
required an immediate reduction in the armed forces in order to
maintain its civilian production.

(38)

Khrushchev announced that the ultimate stage of Communism would
be achieved by 1980.

This was at a time when growth in the Soviet

economy provided grounds for such optimism. The Soviet economy is one
of

full employment where resource allocation is a centralized

decision-making process.

Increased military expenditure without

productivity gains in the economy as a whole would necessitate
resource allocation from a civilian sector of the economy.

The

building of a Communist society is interpreted domestically as a
promise of rising standards of living.

He stated this clearly in

1960;
And as for the development of our peaceful economy,
such a unilateral initiative in the field of disarmament
will do us much good. It will save us 16 to 17 billion
roubles annually. Besides, more than a million young,
energetic, capable workers will go to work in the fields,
factories, power plants, and construction projects. All
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this will of course be beneficial for a further rise in the
living standards of the people. (39)
Khrushchev attempted to unilaterally cut force levels prior to
1961, despite the severe reservations and open disquiet of military
interests in the Kremlin.

He saw that ICBMs reduced the need for

large conventional forces, but the cuts initiated in the four years
prior to 1961, which Khrushchev asserted totalled 2,140,000 men, were
reversed following the Berlin crisis of that year.

(40)

The Test Ban Treaty coincided with increased allocations to
'soft' sectors of the economy.

In December 1963 the-commitment to a

forced development of the fertilizer industry to aid agricultural
production was indeed accompanied by a reduction of the military
budget.

(41)

Conversely, the US military build-up under Kennedy was seen by
Khrushchev to reveal a lack of commitment to reach arms control
agreements and also as an attempt to undermine the economic vitality
of the USSR.

He stated ’They would like to sap our might and by so

doing restore the one time rule of monopoly capitalism.' (42)

He

emphasised the international benefits of disarmaments:
Disarmament does not only benefit a single state or
group of states, it opens the way to a lasting peace and
economic development for all countries and for all peoples.
(43)
By 1963, Khrushchev's economic successes, such as the Virgin
Lands Campaign, had been dramatically reversed, with the result that
economic growth was at the lowest level in Soviet history.

The

economic crisis coincided with the Test Ban Treaty and although a ban
on testing in itself would not release Soviet resources for other
purposes, it was believed that disarmament measures would result from
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such an agreement.

In a note from the Soviet to US Government, it was

stated:
The Soviet Government agrees that the successful
completion of the talks on the banning of nuclear tests
would aid progress in other areas of disarmament. (44)
This explains arms control initiatives at this time - the Soviet
economy required them. The argument is strong, but not convincing.
Decisions of national policy priorities have been shown to be of
an overriding political nature.

Agreement was not reached on

measures which would require multilateral reduction of military
expenditure.

At this time, the USSR approached, with great caution,

solutions to the problems of the arms race, especially those which
would significantly limit future freedom of action, as any technical
breakthrough could destroy military balances.
Khrushchev himself admitted in 1960 and again in 1962 that
consumer welfare must take second place to defence needs. (45) Clearly
military

interests

did

exert

significant

influence

on

policy

priorities within the decision-making (resource allocation) process.
Naturally, a continually spiralling arms race did exert a great strain
on the Soviet economy and therefore stimulated the leadership to
search for at least a limited detente.

A. Dallin summarized Soviet

priorities:
One may therefore assume that Moscow fears - second
only to war - an intensification of the arms race by the US,
and that it has learned to refrain from certain provocative
steps preci ’ so as to forestall such an American
response.
Gonclusi.oti.

The most significant development in the conduct of Soviet foreign
policy during this period was the Kremlin’s pursuit of policies
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designed to manage an international environment overshadowed by the
dangers of nuclear war.

In light of the continued enmity with the

West, A. Dallin suggests that the origins of the detente which
characterized superpower relations during much of the 1970s are to be
found in the search for areas of common interest which began with the
recognition of the catastrophic consequences of thermonuclear war.
(47)

Soviet policies designed to promote arms control were a

dependent variable of inseparable military and political factors.
Whilst the USSR sought to enhance national security in the face of
continued (albeit interrupted) military, technological and economic
superiority of

the West,

the changed nature of

the strategic

relationship necessitated a far reaching reappraisal of ideology and
strategic doctrine.

The result was the general policy of ’peaceful

coexistence* which placed greater emphasis on negotiation with the
West.

Thus, the Soviet leadership was more positively disposed to

seriously discuss disarmament issues in the many international foruns
of the post-war world and enter into high-level negotiations on a
bilateral level with US. Arms control agreements of a symbolic nature
in terms of explosive power and proliferation rather than delivery
vehicles were concluded at the end of the Khrushchev era, but treaties
of real substance were almost a decade away when the enabling
condition of a mutually acknowledged strategic balance could be seen
to be at work.

CHAPTER 4
THE BREZHNEV YEARS:

SALT AND DETENTE

It was during the 1970*s that the first arras limitation agreement
was reached in the nuclear era.

The Strategic Arras Limitation

Treaties (SALT) constrained the central strategic weapons of the
superpowers for the first time since the Washington Naval Treaty of
1922 and symbolized the reciprocity of US and Soviet foreign polices
in an atmosphere of detente.

T.W. Wolfe regarded SALT and detente as

having a symbiotic relationship, with SALT as *a pivotal aspect of
great power relations between the US and Soviet Union, a medium
through which some accommodation of both the disparate political
interests and the perceived strategic necessities of the two sides has
been sought.®

(1)

For the Soviet Union, detente was built upon a strategic
relationship of parity in delivery vehicles with the US. The SALT
treaties were a recognition of that fact - an uncomfortable one for
the US in light of the Soviet military build-up which had taken place
to achieve parity.

The Soviet Union also felt itself to be more

secure due to the dissipation of tensions in Europe, and to their own
efforts toward self-sufficiency and reliance on military power which
coincided with an increasingly active and successful foreign policy,
particularly in the Third World.

The US

suspicious and distrustful of

was

still

Soviet objectives

extremely

and the USSR

exhibited the characteristics of being a reactive power to the
behaviour of the US. Detente and arms limitation did little to alter
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the dynamics of the arms race.
Factors

contributing

to

the USSR's greater willingness

to

conclude meaningful agreements during the 1970s were the persistent
economic strains the arms race put upon the Soviet economy and the
desire to reap the benefits of trade with the West.

In addition,

hostilities with China were still intense and became alarming with the
prospect of Sino-American cooperation.

China had become a regional

super power of enormous significance in calculations of the global
strategic balance.

These were the incentives for the Soviet Union to

make detente with the US work. The Soviet leadership actively pursued
a serious and consistent policy toward concluding significant arms
limitation treaties with the US as the focus and symbol of detente.
The progress and successes of this policy are outlined below.
The precedent set by the signing of the 'Nuclear Test Ban Treaty'
was followed by significant treaties between the US and USSR in the
late 1960's and early 1970's, despite the removal of Khrushchev from
power in October 1964.

Four of these were 'non armament' treaties.

The first was the Treaty on Principles Governing the activities of
States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, signed in January 1967.

This prohibited

the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in
space, on the moon or in orbit and stated that the moon and other
bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

This was a

shift in the Soviet position from 1962 which would not separate non
armanent from other disarmament issues.

(2)
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Hie second 'non armament' agreement was the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed in July 1968,

Underpinning

this treaty was a realization that proliferation would increase the
risk of war by accident or escalation. The Treaty on the Prohibition
of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
was signed in February 1971.

Following a shift in Soviet and US

positions in April 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development,

Production

and

Stockpiling

of

Bacteriological

(Biological) and Toxin weapons and on their destruction was signed.
As

a

result of working

parties

set up during

the SALT

negotiations, an Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak
of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR and a "Hot Line'
Modernization Agreement' were signed in September 1971.
After two and a half years of negotiation, the Interim Agreement
on Strategic Offensive Arms and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM) which together formed SALT I were signed in Moscow on May 26th,
1972. Hie ABM treaty regulated the type and number of missile defences
each side could build, thereby leaving unchallenged the penetration
capability of the other's retaliatory missile force. This enabled the
two sides to effectively agree to freeze their strategic arsenals with
verification by 'national technical means.'

The major flaw of the

agreement was the failure to limit the extent of putting multiple
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVing), ie. targeted warheads, on
missiles. Hiis was to be dealt with in subsequent negotiations.
The momentum of arms limitation was maintained after SALT 1 by
agreement in June 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war between the US
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and USSR.

Holloway sees this as the 'high point* of the Soviet-

American detente. (3)

It committed both sides to remove the danger of

nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons as an 'object of their
policies.'

(4)

implications

It was a bilateral agreement with multi-lateral

which

pledged

the

superpowers

dedicated toward stability and peace.

to

pursue

policies

This was a highly symbolic

agreement and the least restraining of the arms control treaties
during this period.
Thereafter followed a series of agreements on a range of issues.
The first of these was the Protocol of July 1974 which further
restrained deployment of ABM Systems. It limited
System and was to be reviewed every five years.

each side to one ABM
Also in July 1974,

the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed which limited the yield of
test explosions.

In August 1975, both sides agreed to ban weather

modification, and in May 1976 there was agreement to govern under
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
At a meeting between President Ford and General Secretary
Brezhnev at Vladivostock in November 1974, an outline for SALT II was
agreed upon which would replace

the interim agreement with a

comprehensive treaty imposing broad limits on
weapons systems.

strategic offensive

The number of nuclear warheads was not tobe limited

but within the 2400 equal aggregate limits on IGBMs, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers, the number of MIRVed
systems was to be constrained.

This was the basis of the SALT II

treaty signed in June 1979 which remained unratified by the US Senate.
SALT and Strategic Parity

President Johnson had proposed talks on strategic arms limitation
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in January 1964.

Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin met with President

Johnson in 1967, laying the groundwork for further progress in
negotiations, but due to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
September 1968 progress was stalled until after President Nixon’s
inauguration in January 1969 at which time the Soviet leadership
expressed willingness for discussions on this issue.

(5)

Payne

asserts that before 1968, strategic arms control was not on the Soviet
agenda. (6) Tensions with China, the ignominious climb-down over Cuba
in 1962 and the consequent Soviet realization that their strategic
relationship with the US was not one of parity provided a strong
impetus for a rapid military build-up during the 1960s.

In his report

to the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966, Brezhnev stated:
Constant concern for the strengthening of the
country’s defences and the power of our glorious armed
forces is a highly important task of the Soviet State. The
Party deems it necessary to ensure the further development
of the defence industry, the perfection of nuclear rocket
weaponry and all other types of equipment. The security of
our homeland demands this. (7)
Soviet policy was

to be built on a firm military basis which,

after 1968, was sufficiently strong to allow a shift toward arms
limitation.
By the early 1970s, the Soviet-American strategic relationship
became clearly established as one of parity. (8)

The USSR surpassed

the US in the number of ICBMs in 1969 to be followed by total
strategic delivery vehicles and total megatonnage in 1973 and SLBMs in
1975. This

offset the US advantage in bombers and total number of

warheads, which remained throughout the period.(9) See table 1.
Following World War II, the USSR had incessantly sought the
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symbols and the substance of parity with the US.

The military build

up had provided the substance and the symbol was to be formal
recognition of this in the SALT treaties.

This is made clear in

Brezhnev’s report to the 24th Congress in March 1971.
Disarmament is one of the most important international
problems of our time...We are conducting negotiations with
the USA on the limitation of strategic armaments. The
favorable outcome of those talks would make it possible to
avoid another round in the missile arms race and to free
substantial resources for constructive purposes....However, we
should like to emphasize that disarmament talks in general,
and especially talks involving the discussion of highly
delicate military and technological aspects, can be pro
ductive only if the interests of the parties* security are
given equal consideration and no one seeks unilateral
advantages• (10)
W.Clemens

(11), S.Payne

(12) and D.Holloway

(13)

all share the

view that the attainment of strategic parity was the precondition for
negotiation and explains the shift of policy after 1968. This of
course assumes that the USSR did not want to pursue strategic
superiority over the US. As will be shown later, the resources needed
to achieve this were more desperately needed for the domestic economy.
Brezhnev*s view that the key to negotiation success was the
principle of equal security for both sides was shared by President
Nixon who, in February 1972, said:
The approaching strategic parity provided an opportunity
to achieve an overall agreement that would yield no uni
lateral advantage and could contribute to a more stable
strategic environment. (14)
It is interesting to note that under Nixon,

US strategic doctrine

stressed sufficiency rather than superiority.(15) SALT was an outward
and visible sign of strategic parity and a political success for the
USSR

in that it implied recognition by the US of Soviet political

equality.(16)
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THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC BALANCE
Table No. 1
ICBMs
US

USSR

SLBMs

Bombers

US USSR

US

USSR

1982

1052

1500

664 1100

348

140

1980

1054

1400

640

950

348

140

1978

1054

1400

656

810

348

140

1976

1054

1500

656

750*

390

140

1974

1054

1600

656

640

470

140

1972

1054

1500

656

450

520

140

1970

1054

1300*

656

240

520

140

1968

1054

850

656

40

650

155

1966

1054

250

592

30

750

155

1964

800

200

336

20

1280

155

Delivery Vehicles

Warheads

Megatons

1982

2032

2490

11000 8000

4100

7100

1980

2042

2490

10000 6000

4000

5700

1978

2058

2350

9800 5200

3800

5400

1976

2100

2390

9400 3200

3700

4500

1974

2180

2380*

8400 2400

3800

4200*

1972

2230

2090

5800 2100

4100

4000

1970

2230

1680

3900 1800

4300

3100

1968

2360

1045

4500 850

5100

2300

1966

2396

435

5000 550

5600

1200

1964

2416

375

6800 500

7500

1000

* Takeover points.

Source: Ground Zero: Nuclear War.
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It is in the desire to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation
and to enhance the crisis management capability of the superpowers
that T.W.Wolfe sees the most compelling of all Soviet incentives to
pursue arms limitation agreements.
importance of detente, both Wolfe

(17)

Moreover, by stressing the

(18) and Holloway

(19)

see the

Soviet leadership as pursuing a complementary aim, that of slowing the
arms race by restraining a new technological surge by the US which
enjoyed the advantage of better missile accuracy and planned to build
four new systems - cruise missiles, the MX missile, the B1 bomber and
the Trident SLBM.

These systems would qualitatively affect the

strategic balance.
The China Card

Another Soviet incentive to initiate and pursue detente and the
SALT process was the persistent theme of the Soviet leadership that it
was necessary to keep China militarily and economically isolated.
(20) It was following the Sino-Soviet Split in 1959/60 that the Soviet
disposition to arms control became more positive, particularly toward
the banning of nuclear testing, which China was about to begin.

Once

Khrushchev was removed in 1964, the Soviet leadership felt compelled
to placate the Soviet military for a time and test the chances of
rapprochement with Peking.

(21) The Soviet build-up during the 1960s

was in conventional as well as nuclear arms for forces to be deployed
on the Chinese border.

In 1969, tensions between the two countries

were sufficient for massive border clashes.

The intensity of conflict

could be seen in the rhetoric of Pravda editorials.
The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party need all
these absurd inventions only to declare the CPSU and the
Soviet Union *Enemy No. I,1 against whom they intend to
*fight to the finish1 while hiding behind the slogan of
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struggle against ’modern revisionism.*

(22)

With signs of improving relations between the US and China in
1970, Holloway sees Soviet arms control policy as a means to forestall
this development.

(23)

Therefore, the American position was highly

significant for Soviet perceptions.
Soviet leaders failed to get agreement from the US on pursuit of
a joint policy toward China.

Fears of a Sino-American rapprochement

grew following Nixon*s opening to China in 1971-72 and as the Chinese
sought closer Western contact after the death of Mao in 1976. Soviet
relations worsened with the Chinese attack on Soviet client Vietnam in
1977.

In 1978, China signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with

Japan which included an anti-hegemony clause directed at the USSR.

In

June 1978, Brezhnev warned the US not to play the ’China Card* against
the Soviet Union as this was a ’shortsighted and dangerous policy.*
(24)

It was no coincidence that following the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in 1979, the US imposed trade sanctions on the USSR and
gave China Most Favored Nation status.

As will be seen, economics

were as ever an integral part of the superpower relationship.
As in the previous chapter, intensification of the Sino-Soviet
split coincided with successes in US-Soviet arms control negotiations.
Similarly, however, the hypothesis that the two are causally linked
cannot be proven until a significant Sino-soviet rapprochement takes
place.
Whilst Clemens maintains that there is evidence to suggest that
Soviet arms control policy can be justified primarily in terms of
international security requirements,

(25) other factors cannot be
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ignored.

As in all previous chapters, the economics of the arms race

is a dynamic explanatory factor contributing to Soviet willingness to
conclude agreements.
Mature Socialism and the Arms Race

Soviet commentators stressed the economic burden of armaments in
the 1970s as they had done throughout the history of the Soviet state.
In December 1970, Central Committee member I.U.Vlasievich wrote:
*Because of the constant threat from the imperialist powers, the USSR
has been forced to increase it’s military expenditure at the cost of
satisfying other needs.'

(26)

The CIA estimated that between 1967

and 1977, Soviet military spending accounted for 12% of GNP. The rate
of increase in this spending was 15% in 1968, 6% in 1969 and 1.1% in
1970.

(27)

Soviet official figures for combined defence and science

budgets rose from 19.7bn Roubles in 1965 to 39.8bn in 1970 before
easing back to 34.8bn in 1975. The Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute estimated that Soviet defence expenditure rose from
30bn Roubles in 1965

to 42bnin 1970

and 48bn in 1979. (28)

before slowing to 45.4bnin 1975

By

1971, domestic economic problems were

already severe for the USSR.

As the Soviet press were beginning to

recognize 'sober forces' in the West

(26),

the Soviet leadership

were pushing for detente which would give the USSR greater access to
Western technology and credit.

In November 1971, Georgi Arbatov wrote

in Economika:
The economic aspect of the arms race has also assumed
great importance. The enormous expense is a very heavy
burden for the peoples, making it difficult to solve many
acute economic and social problems...One cannot regard the
current low level of trade between the USSR and USA as
normal. (30)
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Foreign

technology

political risk.

would

increase

production

without

domestic

It was therefore no coincidence that the SALT

negotiations were

accompanied by a trade agreement.

In December

1971, Pravda claimed that $125 million worth of contracts had been
signed with US firms.

(31)

However, despite the heavy economic

burden of arms production, the Soviet leadership was willing to bear
it

if necessary.

Detente rather than specific arms limitation

alleviated this problem.
The

USSR

continued

to build

up nuclear

strategic forces

throughout the 1970s to limits prescribed by SALT I.

This was

undertaken to keep up with the extent of US MIRVing of missiles and
required an annual rate of increase in the military budget of between
4 to 5% according to CIA estimates.

(32)

This was equal to the

overall rate of growth in the Soviet economy so that direct defence
spending remained relatively stable at approximately 12% of GNP
throughout the 1970s.

(33)

This ensured that the USSR maintained

military parity with the US - a prerequisite for pursuit of
comprehensive arms limitation on the basis of equality.

By 1979,

Soviet military expenditure was equal to 125% of US expenditure in US
terms with the result that the SALT process was viewed in the US as a
constraint on her technological-economic 'mobilization

potential.1

(34)
Soviet mobilization had exacted a large cost.

Bad harvests in

1972, 1975 and 1979 caused the gap between official and free market
prices of food to rise from 77% in 1975 to 100% in 1978.

(35)

The

gap between the 1976-80 Five Year Plan and its fulfilment also grew,
requiring economic reforms in 1979 and serving to intensify Brezhnev's
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desire to divert resources to agriculture.

(36)

Arms control and

detente aimed to satisfy the need for economic and technological
transfusions from the West

and to divert scarce domestic resources

from the incessant demands of the arms race in order

to increase

domestic agricultural production. As a reflection of this, foreign
trade was given greater weight in economic policy.

(37) However, it

appears on the available evidence that economics was more of

a

contributory rather than determining factor in the Soviet arras control
position.
Additional Factors

Soviet domestic politics provided additional stimulus to pursue
arms limitation objectives.

As Brezhnev consolidated his power during

the late 1960s, priority was placed on military production. Prior to
the 1972 Summit, Shelest was removed as the head of the Ukrainian
Party organization signifying that Conservative opposition* to the
negotiations would not be tolerated.

(36)

This illustrates that

Soviet policy had undergone a re-evaluation of priorities from
emphasis

on

military

production

to

arras control

undermining Kosygin *s claim in March of 1970:

negotiations,

*From the moment of the

appearance of nuclear weapons, the policy of the USSR invariably has
been directed at saving humanity from the threat of nuclear war.1
(40)

Former head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

W.C.Foster, believed this claim, saying in 1971 that it was the moral
leadership required of a nuclear power that had made the USSR more
realistic and friendly toward the US.

(41) This is a fine example of

the hypothesis that entry into the nuclear era has made the USSR more
positively disposed to measures of arms limitation.

However, this
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does not explain the changes and subtle adaptations in the Soviet
position during this period.
Brezhnev had a considerable investment of his prestige in the
continued improvement of Soviet-American relations and had urged that
detente be made ’irreversible* in 1973.

(42)

Prior to 1975, there

had been some disagreement within the ruling circle as to the utility
of this policy and the gains to be made from SALT.

By 1976,

Brezhnev's position was consolidated when Defence Minister Grechko
died and was replaced by Marshal Ustinov who was more favorably
disposed toward Brezhnev's policies.

In October 1977, Brezhnev became

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Also in that year, Ogarkov,

who had been part of the SALT delegation, was promoted to Marshal.
(43)

Ihese changes ensured the survival of the peace policy and

weakened resistance

to economizing and increased efficiency in

relation to the defence budget.
From 1969 to 1975, detente had brought positive results to the
USSR, but the years 1975-79 were less fruitful. The 1973 Arab-Israeli
war and the extent of military and other support each superpower gave
to the opposing forces, the US to Isreal and the Soviet Union to the
Arabs, refocussed attention on the continuity of conflicting policies
designed to promote regional interests.

In 1974, some Soviet

spokesmen were beginning to warn of 'anti-detente circles' in the US.
(44)

The Soviet Union abrogated its trade agreement with the US in

1975 following linkage of this agreement to Jewish emigration from the
USSR.

Some Soviet interests disliked increased dependence on foreign

goods and technology for long range planning as this introduced
unpredictability

into

the

plans

and

increased

Soviet

economic
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dependence on the West,

In addition, US adoption of the fSchlesinger

Doctrine' in 1974 fortified military views in the Kremlin that the US
wished to regain nuclear superiority.

(45) The US perceived the USSR

to be attempting to develop an ICBM force, in the introduction of the
heavy SS-18 missile, which threatened to give the USSR a comparable
advantage in strategic weaponary.
This illustrates how fragile the ground is upon which the
necessary conditions
measures are

for conclusion of meaningful arms control

formed - strategic military parity.

The Soviet

leadership had shown itself to be highly reactive to US behavior and
changes in the perceived threats of the global situation.

In April

1970, Brezhnev announced?
We have created strategic forces that are a reliable
means of deterring any aggressor. We will respond to any
attempts by anyone to gain military superiority over the
USSR with the requisite increase in military might, thereby
guaranteeing our defence. We cannot do otherwise. (46)
'Struggle and Accomodation'

Brezhnev did not make Khrushchev's mistake of alienating the
ideological zealots of the CPSU by forecasting a date for the
establishment of Communism in the USSR.

Instead, he classified Soviet

development as having reached a point of 'mature socialism.' However,
he did continue Khrushchev's policy of advancing the international
cause of socialism by means of 'peaceful coexistence.'
observers

have

labelled

Brezhnev's

adaptation

Western

'struggle

and

accommodation.1 (47)
In 1971, Brezhnev stated that while following a 'consistent
policy of peace and friendship among peoples, the Soviet Union will in
the future carry out a decisive struggle against imperialism.'

(48)
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At the 25th Party Congress in 1976, he reiterated this theme by saying
that detente did not in the slightest abolish, nor could it abolish or
alter, the laws of the class struggle.

(49)

Since the 1950s, the

USSR had pursued an active policy of support for so called ’wars of
national liberation* against what the USSR ideological leadership
called ’imperialist oppression* in the Third World.

In this way,

competition with capitalism could be extended around the World without
risking the outbreak of nuclear war.

This policy of power projection

achieved notable successes in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977,
leading President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Z Brzezinski, to
reflect that SALT II lay ’buried in the sands of the Ogaden.*

(50)

It was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which left President
Carter no option he felt, but to give up on SALT II.
Goodusion
It became clear that the two sides held different perceptions on
the meaning of detente during the course of the 1970s.

A common

interest in arras limitation was built upon the concept of detente.
The political will of the US administration

eroded toward the end of

the decade, whereas the Soviet leadership believed detente and the
arms control agreements which symbolized it to be good things in
themselves for both sides. They consequently pursued detente and arms
control policies consistently throughout the 1970s.
perception was

The Soviet

that increased projection of military power into the

Third World in support of national liberation struggles was not
inconsistent with detente and did not alter their desire for arms
control.

Whereas, for the US, detente was contingent on and later

became linked to Soviet behavior in the third world and regional
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conflicts.

Detente did not stop competition between the superpowers

in their global relationship of a zero-sum game. In two respects, the
detente era was a failure for the Soviet Union.

First, and in stark

contrast to a major aim of detente, relations with China got worse,
intensifying Soviet fear of encirclement.

Second, detente ended with

a new and more threatening round of the arms race.

President Reagan

was elected and expressed US determination not to repeat the mistakes
of SALT.
And so the new Soviet leadership once again had to face up to the
economic burden of maintaining a strategic relationship of military
parity with the US without encompassing constraints on the arms race.
Arms control

continued to be at the center of a profound dilemma for

Soviet policy, which has been conducted from a position of military
parity but relative economic and technological backwardness.

CHAPTER 5:

Fran SALT II to Gorbachev

This chapter brings the study up to the end of 1987 when the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in Washington.
There have been four leaders during this period - Leonid Brezhnev
(died November 1982), Yuri Andropov (died February 1984), Constantin
Chernenko (died March, 1985), and Mikhail Gorbachev who is the first
Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to be bom
after the 1917 revolution.

He has another first to his name as the

Soviet signatory of the first nuclear Disarmament treaty since atomic
weapons were first developed in 1945 - the INF agreement. This is the
one major success of the period.

On the negative side, the force

limits set out in SALT II have been exceeded and the 1972 ABM treaty
is in serious danger of being broken
An asymmetric strategic military balance will be explored as the
crucial factor in enabling the USSR to conclude the INF treaty, engage
in meaningful Strategic Arm Reduction Talks (START) and defend the ABM
treaty from potentially destabilizing developments.

It is in the

field of domestic economic considerations that a real dynamic can be
seen to be at work. The imperative for the USSR was to arrest falling
growth rates in order to maintain a its position of rough military
parity. Maintenance of this balance in the face of challenges from the
US and China was to be done by diverting resources to the domestic
economy. This was the Soviet Union*s

self-interest in fostering a

climate of *neo-detente* with the US. Arms control and disarmament
talks were to be a central element in the drive to reach this
objective. The gradual improvement in Sino-Sovient relations and
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any impact it may
examined.

have

on

disarmament

postures will also be

First, a brief review of negotiations and related

developments from 1979 to the end of 1987 is in order.
Superpower relations deteriorated rapidly in late 1979 with the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the NATO decision to deploy
Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe to
counter the threat of the MIRVed Soviet SS-20 missiles.

In January

1981, Ronald Reagan became U.S. President after a campaign in which he
described the SALT II Treaty as

*fatally flawed*, and promised a

build-up of conventional and nuclear forces. (1) A leading member of
his Cabinet, Edwin Meese, said in 1981 that arms control should be
subject to 'benign neglect.* (2)
The Soviet negotiators shifted the emphasis at the Mutual
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna and at the INF and
START talks in Geneva to the prevention of the Pershing II and GLCM
deployments.

They could not accept Reagan's 'Zero Option' proposal of

November 1981 which proposed the removal of all SS-20s from Europe and
Asia in return for cancelling plans to station Pershing II and GLCMs.
This was in fact the outline and basis of the INF treaty
In May 1982, Brezhnev proposed a freeze on strategic weapons.
The US response at the START talks was to propose a projected cut in
Soviet land-based missile capabilities, which
considered out of the question.

the Soviet leadership

In June, the USSR proposed that both

sides reduce the number of missiles and bombers of each side to 1800;
warheads would be reduced from 7500 to 5000 each with no more than
half those warheads atop land-based ICBMs* (3)

The USSR's force
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structure was such that 75% of their warheads were atop ICBMs whilst
the US figure was 25%.

Consequently, this proposal implied a major

restructuring of opposing nuclear forces and directly addressed US
dissatisfaction with the SALT II Treaty in terms of the asymmetry of
the strategic nuclear equation.

However, more pressing negotiations

were taking place in the INF talks.
These began in Geneva in November 1981 and were troubled from the
start by the difficulty in agreeing on which weapons systems to weigh
in the balance of INF forces. The US view was that the USSR held a 6:1
advantage in medium range nuclear forces. In the Soviet Union’s view,
a rough parity existed. Disagreement over the numbers centered on
whether a total of 263 British and French missiles, SLBMs and bombers
would be included as they were in the Soviet calculations, the rate of
dismantling of Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s, the number of Soviet SS-N-5s
SLBMs in European and the type of bombers to be included. (4) Also,
what were Soviet requirements for the security of its border with
China?
Brezhnev offered to stop deployment of SS-20s in European USSR
and reduce unilaterally its forces in return for a moratorium on the
deployment of INF forces. This was modified in March 1982 when
Brezhnev said the USSR would halt INF force deployment before any
agreement was reached, indicating serious interest to avert the
deployment of Cruise and Pershing II. (5)
According

to

an

informal

agreement

reached between

chief

negotiators Paul Nitze and Yuri Kvitsinski in July 1982 during a
celebrated ’walk in the woods,' the USSR and US would each limit
deployment of missiles in Europe to 75 launchers each.

The question
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of MIRVing was not addressed.

This apparent breakthrough would have

allowed the US to deploy GLCMS but not Pershing IIs, a potential
first strike weapon with a flying time of 4-8 minutes to the western
part of the USSR and therefore more threatening.

In effect, this deal

would have given the US superiority in terms of numbers of warheads as
GLCMs carry foureach and SS-20s carry three.
unacceptable to both Moscow and Washington.

This formula was

Andropov offered a new

concession in December 1982 with an offer to hold the number of SS-20s
deployed down to

162, equal to thenumber ofBritish and French

nuclear forces. (6)

Although this was the first time in arms control

negotiations that a superpower had offered to scrap first-line modern
weapons,

little progress was made on the basis of this proposal.

Relations became more strained during 1983 as the date for
deployment approached.

Reagan labelled the USSR an 'evil empire' and

a Soviet spokesman called him and his advisers 'nuclear maniacs.' (7)
Further deterioration followed in September with the shooting down of
a Korean airliner which had strayed into Soviet airspace.

By

November, Andropov

had decided that he could not do business with the

US administration.

Soviet delegations suspended participation in all

the principal arms control negotiations - the first time since 1969
that arms control was shut down across the board.
As the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs became imminent,
Soviet attention shifted from Euromissiles to space weapons.

In March

1984, new leader Chernenko suggested a treaty to demilitarize space
and a moratorium on anti-satellite testing.

Reagan's Strategic

Defence Initiative (SDI) was viewed in Moscow as an invitation to
enter into an expensive and threatening new arms race in space.

In
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November, Foreign Minister Gromyko went to Washington to meet US
Secretary of State Shultz and President Reagan.

Together they

announced that the USSR and US would begin new negotiations covering
*the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons.*
(8)

In 1985, arms control talks returned to centre stage as the

chosen vehicle to rebuild a constructive US-Soviet relationship.
In the Summer of

1985,

new

leader Gorbachev announced a

unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

By November, sufficient

groundwork had been done to enable Reagan and Gorbachev to meet in a
Geneva summit.

They declared common ground on the principle of a 50%

reduction in nuclear weapons as well as on the idea of an interim INF
agreement.

They also signed agreements in which both sides pledged

that nuclear war must never be fought and that neither side would seek
to achieve military superiority.

In January 1986, Gorbachev proposed

complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, and less ambitiously,
he proposed the elimination of all INF in Europe.

In May, Reagan

announced that the US would break the unratified - but adhered to force limits of the

SALT II Treaty. At the Conference on Confidence

and Security-Building measures and Disarmament in Europe, the USSR
agreed in September to measures to reduce the likelihood of surprise
attack which included, significantly,
site inspections a year.

a verification process of 3 on

This was the background to a quite

extraordinary Summit held in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986.
According to figures used at the Summit, the number of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles possessed by each side at that time were as
follows;

2500 for the USSR carrying 11000 warheads and 1900 US

vehicles carrying 13000 warheads.

(9)

(These figures did not
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incorporate the relative *throw-weight' of those warheads in which the
USSR enjoyed an advantage).

Gorbachev proposed new ceilings of 1600

delivery vehicles carrying 6000 warheads for each side.

He also

accepted Reagan*s *Zero Option* plan for Europe, leaving 100 INF
missiles each in Asia and Alaska.

In exchange, he wanted the US to be

bound to the ABM treaty for ten years, which would confine all SDI
research to laboratories.

In response, Reagan called for the USSR to

eliminate all ICBMs in the same period. Raising the stakes, Gorbachev
proposed the complete elimination of strategic nuclear weapons within
ten years, again linked to the ABM proviso. No deal.
It was a frustrating and disappointing end to the Summit but the
establishment of crisis control centers was agreed and real progress
was made regarding INF.

Gorbachev later accepted the double zero

principle not just for Europe but on a global basis, opening the way
for full agreement.
Ihe INF treaty was signed in Washington on December 8th, 1987.
It was an agreement to destroy over 1400 Soviet warheads already
deployed or awaiting deployment in Europe and Asia and 400 US
warheads, all with ranges of 300 to 3000 Kms.

(10)

In addition to

verification by national technical means, this treaty set a precedent
with an ’Inspection Protocol* which stipulated on-site inspection at
120 Soviet and 25 US locations for a duration of 13 years.

(11) Even

with a clear improvement in US-Soviet relations after 1985, this
treaty was a very significant achievement.

Following rapid change in

the Soviet leadership, it was a considerable success for Gorbachev the product of political, military and economic imperatives.
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The Military Balance in the 1980s

On September 19th 1987, the editorial of The Economist stated its
views of what makes successful superpower relations possible.

These

were:
not goodwill, good intentions or even good ideas; instead
an objective balance of power and advantage between Russia
and the West which makes reasonable deals attractive to
both. The right kind of balance now exists for the world
to enjoy a long period of calm in Russia-Araerican
relations. (12)
The editorial went on to remind its readers that relaxation of
tensions did not mean that goodwill had replaced fhard self-interest*
as the driving force of the USSR.

(13)

The succession crisis impacted foreign policy with regard to the
military balance in Europe. It was in this area that a shift in the
focus of the USSR's arms control and disarmament policy became
apparent after 1984.

Soviet efforts in the 1979-1984 period were

directed toward averting NATO's deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs in
Europe and to stalling a new arms race in space. The threat of a
potentially destabilising arms race in space remained to confront
Gorbachev after 1984, but, the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs
was already a reality. This necessitated a different approach to the
question of medium range forces as part of a broader strategic balance
as well as the issue of linkage with the space race.
First, it is necessary to examine the background of the INF
treaty with regard to medium range nuclear systems in Europe which
dates back to the 'failings' of the SALT treaties, the evolution of
nuclear strategies and the specific question of the SS-20.
The SALT process bestowed upon the USSR co-equal superpower
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status in terms of strategic forces. Hie treaties did not cover medium
range nuclear systems, theater nuclear weapons and the balance of
conventional forces. These were crucial factors for Europe.
For the USSR's leadership under Brezhnev, before, during and
after the SALT negotiations, concern was directed toward US and NATO
Forward Based Systems (FBS). (14) The nuclear capable F-lll fighter
bomber was introduced into Europe by the US in 1971. By 1974, the US
alone had 700 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons in Europe
according to US Govemament sources. (15) In addition, 84 British and
French SLBMs were directed at the USSR at this time with over 100
ready to become operational, as well as British Vulcan bombers and
French Mirage jets. (16) The USSR also had to confront the threat
posed by China.
These forces were deployed as the mainstay of NATO (France aside)
European defenses to offset the far superior conventional capabilities
of the Warsaw Pact and as such, the US refused to include these FBS
forces in the SALT equation. NATO's view was that strategic parity
left Europe

open now

that

the

credibility of

escalation was

undermined. NATO's adoption of the doctrine of 'flexible response* in
the mid-1970s to address this shortcoming placed a premiun on systems
with quick reaction time in which the USSR was inferior. This was
viewed in the Soviet Union as lowering the nuclear threshold and a
strategy to fight a limited nuclear war with superior theater
airpower. (17)
Soviet medium range nuclear forces in the 1970s were mainly
comprised of aging SS-4s and SS-5s deployed in the 1950s and 60s, and
TU-16 and TU-22 bombers deployed in 1955 and 1963 respectively. (18)
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New systems were developed in the 1960s and 70s to augment these
systems,

SS-14 and SS-15s were deployed in the mid-1960s but not in

any great numbers.

Around 170 variable range ICBMs, the SS-11, were

deployed in the western USSR in the early 1970s but were soon replaced
by SS-19s. (19) After 1974, the TU-22M ’Backfire* bomber replaced 225
TU-16s and 22s but only 90 were operational by 1977. (20)
It was the replacement of SS-4s and 5s (single warheads) with the
multiple warheaded and mobile SS-20s from 1976 onwards which prompted
NATO to adopt the ’Dual Track* policy of December 1979. This called
for the deployment of 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing II missiles in Europe
which were percieved as very threatening in the Soviet Union.
According to R. Garthoff, the decision to depoly SS-20s was
'natural' for the USSR's leadership and was 'fully compatible with the
SALT negotiations.'

He cites four reasons for this view. First, the

missiles were a response to the threat posed by the medium range
forces of Britain, France, China, and US bomber forces in Europe and
the Far East.

Second, they were deployed as a modernization of SS-4s

and 5s which took 8-24 hours to prepare to fire and were thus easy
targets and little use in countering 'flexible response.' Third, SS-11
and SSN-6 missiles could not be kept as these counted against the USSR
in the SALT numbers.

Finally, SS-14s and 15s had proved to be too

unreliable. (21)
There was also an element of the SS-20 being a product of the
dynamics of the inflexible Soviet procurement process, being deployed
for the sake of incorporating the latest technology into the nuclear
arsenal.
By December 1979, 81 were deployed in the western part of the
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Soviet Union. By November 1981, 243 were deployed.

The total reached

405 with 1,215 warheads by the time the INF treaty was signed. This
was a major addition to Soviet forces even offsetting for the
replacement of older missiles.
According to H. Gelman, the Soviet achievement in the first half
of the 1970s of what he labels a 1robust parity* in relation to the
overall balance of forces was followed, in the second half, by a
sustained effort to build a more decisive theater nuclear capability
in Europe and Asia. (22) W. Hyland, a senior officer at the US State
Department, summed up the view in Washington in 1979 that the SS-20
was a ’precise instrument of intimidation* through which the USSR
aimed *to make West European policy subject to a Soviet veto.* (23)
The SS-20 was also seen in the US as an attempt to make NATO policy
unworkable and gave the Soviet Union 'escalation dominance.' This was
the rationale of the 'Dual Track' decision of 1979 which was intended
to restore the military balance in Europe as Warsaw Pact conventional
superiority with SS-20s was viewed as undermining the credibilty of
'flexible response.' (24)
The view from Moscow was that SS-20s did not threaten the parity
which existed in Europe.

In October 1979, Brezhnev claimed that the

number of Soviet medium range missiles has actually been reduced and
the Soviet Union had fewer medium range bombers than NATO. Therefore,
SS-20s did not upset the balance. (25)

The decision to deploy GLCMs

and Pershing IIs in Europe was thus seen as an attempt by the US to to
move to a position of superiority.

This view was reinforced with the

espousal by new US President Reagan of the concept of limited nuclear
war in Europe.

The implication was that such a war would engulf the
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heart of the Soviet Union including Moscow but leave the US unscathed.
This was, in Holloway*s view, a competition of strategies as well as
arms.

Each side believed the other to be attempting to make the

other*s unworkable. (26)
Holloway also points out that defining parity in specific terms
is not a technical, but a political problem, (27) The radically
different estimates of the European nuclear balance in November 1981 parity versus a 6:1 Soviet lead - is an ideal case in point.
Relations between the superpower deteriorated rapidly after 1979.
On top of the succession crisis, the USSR was confronted with the
adverse international reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan and the
shooting down of the Korean airliner, a potential revolution in Poland
in 1981 and a break down in arms talks with the US.

In contrast,

President Reagan was enjoying a recovery in the status of his office.
He had public support

for large

increases in expenditure for

conventional and nuclear weapons programs that were openly advertized,
at least initially, as intended to restore US military superiority.
The new administration demonstrated willingness to use force by
invading Grenada.

US troops arrived in Beirut and the anti-Sandanista

(Contra)

were

rebels

wholeheartedly

supported.

priorities were subordinated to a military build-up.

Arms

control

The navy would

be expanded to 600 ships and Pershing IIs and GLCMs would be deployed
in Europe.

Force modernization was speeded up with the production of

MX and midgetman ICBMs, Trident II/D5 SLBMs and new B1 and Stealth
bombers were being developed.

Both quantitively and qualitatively, US

military capabilities were enhanced. On the Soviet side, two new
ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25, were deployed.
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In effect, the political will necessary to define an agreeable
parity in medium range forces was lacking during the 1979-84 period.
Brezhnev attempted to halt the 'Dual Track' deployments by appealing
directly to Western European public opinion via the Der Speigel
interview. He made concessions in Novemebr 1981 and offered to halt
SS-20 deployments before any agreement in May 1982. The 'walk in the
woods' potential deal of July 1982 was followed by Andropov's offer to
hold the number of SS-20s equivalent to British and French forces.
However, the leadership made some major miscalculations in
trying to achieve their goal. Gromyko was the USSR's Foreign Minister
throughout this period. In Haslam's view, he remained steadfastly
'Americocentric'and did not pay due attention to the realignment in
Europe underway at this time. Western European Governments were able
to ensure the maintenance and enhancement of a visible US nuclear
presence on the continent in the face of huge public protests from
Berlin to London. In essence, Western Europe Governments moboiized the
US to the percieved Soviet threat to Europe. (28)
Despite the offer of concessions, deployments of SS-20s continued
throughout this period as part of the modernization program with more
bases built in 1984 than any other year. Presumably, these missiles
would be used as bargaining chips once negotiations resumed. Ihey
would also offset the threat posed by the new NATO systems. Haslam
suggests that the Soviet leadersip assumed that the momentum of
detente was irreversible but the 1984 Presidential election provided
no impetus for the US to restart negotiations. (29)

Not only was

Reagan negatively disposed to arms control at this time, the US
administration

did

not

incorporate

the

concept

of

offsetting
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asymmetries into its assessment of the military balance before the end
of 1983. (30)
The final mistake Soviet leaders in this period made in the
attempt to avert NATO deployments via agreement, was to stick to the
concept of linkage with regard to the SDI.
By the time Gorbachev came to power, the objective situation had
changed.

GLCMs and Pershing IIs were stationed in Europe and the

build up on both sides had damaged detente with the (JS and relations
with Western Europe.

Gorbachev adopted policies better suited to

these changes.
However, the 1972 ABM Treaty remained under threat as the US
pressed ahead with the SDI project. For their part, the USSR has been
charged by the US with breaking the treaty by establishing a large
radar at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia.
political

and

military

danger

which

For Gorbachev, this was a
would

undermine

co-equal

superpower status as he pointed out in his book Perestroika, published
in 1987:
the United States is not ready to part with its hope of winning
nuclear superiority and this time wants to get ahead of the
Soviet Union by speeding up SDI research.••.SDI means moving
weapons to a new medium which would greatly destabilize the
strategic situation. (31)
Underlying this threat were technological and economic factors.
On top of the large reallocation of resources needed to match such an
ambitious

project,

the USSR would need

to catch up with US

developments using kinetic weapons, lazer particle beams and hydrogen
fluoride chemical lazers as well as the utilization of advanced
computers.

Gorbachev reviewed the past 15 years of Soviet economic

development in Perestroika:
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Compared with advanced nations the gap in the efficiency
of production, scientific and technological development,
the production of advanced technology and the use of
advanced techniques began to widen, and not to our advantage.
(32)
This was the most dynamic factor accounting for a clear shift in
the USSR's arms conto1 and disarmament stance with regard to Europe
under Gorbachev's leadership.

In support of this view, Holloway

points out that Gorbachev's succession was not only a turning point in
Soviet political history, but coincided with a turning point in Soviet
economic history. (33) This point will be dealt with in greater depth
later.

Gorbachev could not, however, make concessions that would be

detrimental to the security of the USSR.

In January 1986, Gorbachev

stated that the material and intellectual potential of the USSR gave
them 'the possibility of developing any weapon if we are forced to do
so.'

(34)

By December 1987, the action-reaction dynamic of the arms

race was vividly demonstrated when he declared that in terms of SDI
research, the Soviet Union was doing all that the US was doing.

(35)

Ihere was a continuity in policy in terms of linking negotiations
to SDI.

As a trade off to constrain development of SDI, Gorbachev

became amenable to accepting substantial reductions in high value
forces as shown by his sweeping proposals in Reykjavik as well as
agreeing to an INF deal in principle.

The broad agreement to cut

strategic forces by 50% would enable the superpowers to establish a
numerical balance but this would be linked

to strict observance of

the 1972 ABM treaty as Gorbachev pointed out:
Since the Americans want to get rid of the ABM Treaty and
pursue SDI - which is an instrument for ensuring domination then there is a need for a package where everything is
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interconnected.

(36)

SDI remained the chief obstacle to agreement.
This changed at the 27th Party Congess at end of 1986 when
Gorbachev announced:
We must not let the 'Star Wars* program be used as a stimulus
to a further arms race and as an obstacle on the road to radical
disarmament. It would seriously help to overcome this obstacle
if we could make tangible progress concerning a decisive
reduction in nuclear cababilities. Iherefore, the Soviet Union
is prepared to take a step in this direction by resolving the
question of mediixn range missiles in the European zone
separately - unconnected with the problems of strategic and
space based armaments. (37)
According

to

W.

Hyland,

Gorbachev

recognized

that

the

*correlation of forces' was no longer favorable to the USSR and that
it was an opportune moment
with the US.

(38)

for him

to establish

an

equilibrium

Whilst trends may appear unfavorable, deals are

made on existing equilibrium.

For the USSR, arms control was the

vehicle to secure equal status and a means to protect regional and
strategic gains against a technically superior rival.

Consequently,

Gorbachev accepted Reagan's zero-option on INF forces which required
dismantling a disproportionate number of Soviet missiles. He conceded
that there existed *a certain asymmetry' in the military make-up of
Europe but stated that the USSR stood for:
eliminating the inequality existing in some areas, but
not through a build-up by those who lag behind but through
a reduction by those who are ahead. (39)
As A.B. Sherr points out, it was only after Gorbachev assumed
power that the Soviet leadership proved willing to accept losses and
adopt a 'radically* different negotiating approach which better served
underlying Soviet interests. (40) He gave up the SS-20 and made
disproportionate cuts in medium range defences.

In return, GLCMs and
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Pershing IIs were removed from Europe and pressure was exerted on
Britain and France to stem expansion of their forces.

In doing so,

they acknowledged the right to independent arsenals, and provided some
momentum for the denuclearization of Europe.
Ihe real success was in improving the image of the Soviet Union
and relations with Western Europe.

Problems were mounting in Eastern

Europe and the need for European help for the economy far outweighed
the military and political advantages of the missiles. (41) Longer
terra national interests were served by the INF treaty.
to an end.

It was a means

The agreement gave impetus to negotiations on space

weapons and was necessary to give the disarmament process a lease of
life before the 1988 US Presidential election.
The new disarmament regime was still based

on the notion of

equal security and the maintenance of a balance between the forces of
the USSR and US. This was Gorbachev1s view;
There is a rough equality and parity between the US and
the USSR in terms of the power and potential of the strategic
forces.... A bomber more or a bomber less means little in
the context of the present strategic balance....All the Soviet
proposals envisage equality and a balance at all stages. We
prepare our proposals thoroughly, proceeding from the idea that
no country would agree to act to the detriment of its security.
(42)
Haslam argues that Gorbachev had only broken with the policies of
his predecessors in redefining security as a political problem,
requiring a political rather than a military solution, as this was a
far cheaper option. (43)
From

to Perestroika and Crisis

The economic impetus for the USSR to forge better relations with
the West in the 1980s will be seen to be exceptionally strong.

As
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arms control is the most prominent element of a better relationship
between the superpowers, assessing the extent to which domestic
concerns drive foreign policy is central to understanding Soviet
intentions

to negotiate and conclude deals.

Intense economic

pressures proved to be a major driving force of Soviet self-interest
in reaching agreement on the basis of secure

coequal superpower

status so that resources could be released for the non-military
sectors of the economy.
Therehad been economic malaise in the USSR during the 1970s and
the clear trend for the 1980s of declining secular growth rates.
According to Chief Soviet economist and architect of Perestroika,Abel
Agenbegyan, growth rates for the period 1980-85 were 3% in the labor
market, 5% in the output of extractive industries, and 17% in capital
investment.

The indices for 1975-80 were 6%, 10% and 23%.

For 1970-

75,

they were 6%, 26% and 44%. (44) This was a significant decline

and

trends suggested further deceleration.

In the years 1984 and

1985, growth in Soviet National Income was at its lowest level in the
post war period - 2.4% and 3.1%.

(45)

The target for the 11th Five

Year Plan (1981-85) of the planned growth rate of investment was 1215%.

This sharply contrasts with the figure for the Tenth Plan which

was 29%.

(46)

Gorbachev recalls that 'an unbiased and honest

approach led us to the only logical conclusion that the country was
verging on crisis.'

(47)

Holloway points out that for the first time in the post-Stalin
period, Soviet leaders were unable to combine growth in military
expenditure with steady improvements in the standard of living and a
high rate of investment.

(48)

Just how far defence expenditure has
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been protected against the effects of this economic slowdown is not
clear.
The

dire

economic

problems of its own.

situation

Gorbachev

inherited developed

The depletion of existing mines, oil and

gasfields was driving natural resource development even further north
in Siberia, raising resource exploitation costs.

In addition, the

USSR lost around $7 billion of export revenue in 1986 due to the
combination of falling world oil prices and a devalued US$, finishing
the year with a deficit onbalance of trade with the West of some $2
billion.

(49) The CIA. has estimated that the Soviet economy grew in

real terms by a mere 0.5% in 1987.

(50)

This is in stark contrast to the expenditure levels of the Reagan
administration engaged in an extensive program of military force
expansion.

In 1981, US defence expenditure was $ 144 billion.

1986, it was projected to have reached $343 billion.

By

US defence

spending rose in real terms by 30% between 1982 and 1984. (51)
This build-up was perceived in Moscow as a plan designed to do
'economic damage1 to the USSR.

It was, in Gorbachev's words, an

immoral attempt by the US to 'bleed the USSR white economically'

and

to lure them with a new arms race against an American economy roughly
twice the size of the USSR's.(52)
Perhaps more importantly, this challenge to the USSR involved the
development of advanced technology such as microcircuitry, directed
energy systems, and genetic engineering. In these areas, the USSR was
distinctly backward and according to W. Odom, they could not be
developed in the USSR without extensive access to Western economics
and R. & D. communities.

(53)

He posits a direct relationship
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between arms control and trade control.

The US did exert pressure on

European and Asian allies not to export capital and technology to the
USSR particularly during the first half of the 1980s.

Relations

between West Germany and the US were strained over German input into
the Siberian Gas Pipeline project in 1983.

(54)

Jacobsen supports

the view of direct links between arms control and trade control,
stating that in the context of the Soviet economic slowdown:
sweeping arms control proposals and extensive concessions
to past Western demands [made by Andropov] may well come to
be seen as a last ditch effort and a last chance. (55)
The pressing need for improved Soviet economic performance was
required in light of two other factors. China*s modernization program
had been underway for some time and had produced greatly increased
growth rates.

This had uncomfortable implications for the Soviet

leadership which will be analysed in greater depth below.

Also, the

economic burden of financing the Third World excursions of the
Brezhnev era forced the new Soviet leaders to pessimistically reassess
the cost/benefit ratio of those commitments. Over 100,000 troops were
pinned down in a seemingly unending war in Afghanistan, a constant
supply of aid flowed to support Cuba’s flagging economy and interests
in Southern Africa, and $3m a day was being pumped into support for
the Vietnamese regime and its occupation of Kampuchea.

(56)

Severe economic pressures to reduce or at least to halt the
increase in defence spending provides the precondition for willingness
to negotiate and conclude arms control deals as the main element of
better superpower relations.

Bad relations would cost too much in

terms of money for military budgets and in attention diverted from
reform.

For Gorbachev, a START deal involving overall cuts in weapons
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systems and a halt, to modernization linked to a ban on at least
deployment of spare systems would relieve pressure on the economy, at
least for a while. He was faced with the prospect that he may have to
spend billions on a counter Star Wars program.
different

matter

to

suggest

that

economic

However, it is a
and

technological

inferiority pressurized the USSR into arras control deals as a direct
function of that inferiority. Gorbachev wrote:
Hopes to wring any advantages in technology or advanced
equipment so as to gain superiority over our country are
futile. To act on the assumption that the Soviet Union is
in a 'hopeless position* and that it is necessary just to
press it harder to squeeze out everything that the US wants
is to err profoundly. (57)
[The West must] get rid of the delusion that the Soviet Union
needs disarmament more than "the West and that just a little
pressure could make us renounce the principle of equality.
We will never do that. (58)
As in previous eras, the USSR would make the necessary sacrifices and
respond to this challenge if forced to do so rather than make
concessions which jeopardize its security.

Considering Reagan's SDI

aim of establishing an effective defence from nuclear attack and to
make nuclear weapons 'obsolete,' Gorbachev asserted that

a Soviet

response would not be too costly:
But we, the Soviet leadership, know that there is nothing
which the US could achieve that our scientists and engineers
could not. A tenth of the US investments would be enough to
create a counter-system to frustrate SDI. (59)
Many top US scientists opposed to SDI have made a similar point.
Clearly, better relations would be preferable economically and
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politically.

The USSR has embarked upon revolutionary economic

reforms under the banner of ‘Perestroika* (Restructuring).

Following

on from the initiatives of Andropov, the first batch of measures was
punitive.

It included an anti-alcohol crackdown, a discipline

campaign, a law against corruption and the black economy and the
replacement of ineffectual and ’corrupt* officials.

Andropov had

fired over twenty Ministers and Deputy Ministers along with 20-30% of
Party and Government officials at the local level.

(60)

The second batch of measures, dating from 1985,
profoundly transform the economy.

proposed to

Planning and production in the

economy would be done in accordance with ‘cost-accounting* methods
rather than the *gross-output*

approach.

This would mean that

individual productive units would become self-financing and exposed to
market forces.

Private enterprise was permitted in an atmosphere of

*Glasnost* (Openness), democratization and *de-Brezhnevization.*

The

government also announced proposals to establish Joint Ventures with
foreign firms which would hopefully import much needed capital,
technology and expertise.
Increased trade with the West is undoubtedly a major factor
underlying the Soviet desire for better relations, but it cannot be
said that other factors are subordinated to this aim. Gorbachev points
this out:
Economic contacts provide the material basis for political
rapprochement....not only economic factors prompt us to
cooperate. Political goals are more important here than
economic ones. (61)

93
The China Factor

Incorporation of the new variables of Sino-Soviet and SinoAmerican relations into the superpower strategic equation provides us
with a triangular framework of analysis which is far from equilateral.
The Sino-American relationship was on a more positive
the Sino-Soviet.

footing than

Relative shifts in these positions during the 1980s

were, to a certain extent, reflected in the arms control posture of
the USSR.
The early 1980s were particularly bad years for Sino-Soviet
relations.

The political problems caused by Soviet encirclement of

China were substantial.

Soviet expansion into Afghanistan, continued

support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the deployment of
SS-20s in Asia, and the growth of the Soviet military presence alone
the 7000 miles of the Sino-Soviet border, from 45 divisions in 1973 to
53 divisions in 1985, all served to reinforce the natural enmity of
the two powers.

Soviet unease with China's close economic and

political ties with the US was compounded by the sporadic but
nonetheless spectacular success of Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping's
modernization program.

The USSR also experienced strained relations

with Japan and the ASEAN countries at this time.
From 1982, the triangular dynamic assumed a new quality resulting
from a gradual improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and a shift in the
basis of Sino-American relations.

Chinese foreign policy changed from

orientation towards the US as an ally against Soviet expansion to a
more balanced stance characterized in Beijing as 'independent.

(62)

Whilst regular military contacts with the US were maintained, at no
time did the Chinese express willingness to enter into a formal
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alliance with the US.

Emphasizing their non-aligned status, the

Chinese leadership felt free to criticize the policies and actions of
others they considered contrary to their values and interests.

Deng

announced that China was ‘against whoever goes in for development of
outer space weapons.' (63)
Sino-Soviet

relations

gradually

improved.

In March 1982,

Brezhnev expressed his desire for normalization of relations between
the USSR and China and a willingness to establish talks.

(64)

In

1983, Andropov and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua met for the
first top level Sino-Soviet talks since 1969.

Chinese President Li

Xianian stated his desire for improved relations at Andropov's
funeral.

Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers met at the UN in

September 1984 and in December, Soviet Vice Premier Ivan Arkhipov
visited Peking to sign an agreement establishing a five year trade
accord.
A day after Chernenko's death in March 1985, Gorbachev declared
that he wished to see a serious improvement in relations with China
and considered that, given reciprocity, this was fully possible.
Peking took note of this 'positive attitude.'

(65)

In July, another five year bilateral trade agreement was signed
which aimed to double trade by 1990.

This would establish a

connection between each system's planning cycles. Trade has increased
gradually from 1982 when borders were opened so that by 1985, it was
worth $1.9 billion - a 60% increase on 1984.

(66)

However, Sino-

American trade was worth $6.1 billion in 1984 and $8 billion in 1985.
(67)

Greater still was China's trade with the economic colossus of

Asia, Japan.

Sino-Soviet trade remained a small portion of China's
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overall trade which totalled $59 billion in 1985, a 19% increase over
1984.

(68)

Modest trade links between the USSR and China did little to
resolve outstanding political issues of disagreement.

Prospects for

the resolution of these greatly improved in 1987 with the INF
agreement.

All SS-20s deployed in Asia and targeted on China would be

removed and destroyed.

It also became clear that the USSR intended to

withdraw all troops from Afghanistan - the first time that the Soviet
Government has voluntarily conceded territory and a definite reversal
of

the

Brezhnev

doctrine.

The

last

remaining

obstacle

to

normalization of relations would be removed if the USSR exerted its
influence over Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea.

Deng Xiaoping

unconditionally offered to meet Gorbachev in a summit if this
happened.

(69)

Sino-Soviet rapprochement was still a long way off but these
events signalled a clear political trend to this end. This undermines
the thesis that an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations will make the
USSR less willing to negotiate and conclude arms control agreements.
Entering 1988, the two policies appeared compatible, especially in
relation to 'Perestroika*.

However, W. Mills points out that should

the difference between economic growth rates averaging 7.5% over the
past ten years for the Chinese and 1.8% for the Soviets from 1976 to
1984 continue,

the balance of relative capabilities will shift

significantly in China's favor in the long-run. (70)
Other Factors
Consistent with the public statements of previous Soviet leaders,
Gorbachev supports the view that the effects of a nuclear war would be
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catastrophic and one should not be fought, as there could only be
losers:
If the huge stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and other weapons
that have been accumulated are unleashed, nothing will remain
of the world. What we are talking about is the survival of
humanity. (71)
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in April 1986, also
raised the spectre of the nuclear consequence of a conventional
conflict in Europe.

Gorbachev said of the accident that it

’mercilessly reminded us what all of us would suffer if a nuclear
thunderstorm was unleashed. * (72)
He has regularly renounced the first use of nuclear weapons and at the
Geneva Summit, both sides pledged that a nuclear war must never be
fought.
For Gorbachev,

the sufficiency of just a fewweapons to incur

unacceptable damage

was justificationin itself

for substantial

reductions in force

levels. This followed on from the logic that

detente had been based on the realization that a nuclear war could not
be won:
The Soviet Union and United States now have the capacity to
destroy each other many times over. It would seem logical,
in the face of a strategic stalemate, to halt the arms race
and get down to disarmament. (73)
Fear of nuclear catastrophe is, amongst others,

a valid reason

why arms control and disarmament deals are done. However, this fear
has been seen to be a major component of Soviet leaders* thinking on
arms control and disarmament issues from the beginning of the nuclear
era. As there is only one data point to assess the impact of this
factor in accounting for the Soviet leadership*s disposition
engage in

negotiations

to

and sign agreements, it does little to
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explain why the negotiation process can result in agreement at certain
times and not others.
Another consistent theme in the policy statements of Soviet
leaders

has

disarmament.

been

the call

for

general

and

complete

nuclear

This has been widely perceived in the West as a

propaganda tool. However,

in Reykjavik it appears that Reagan and

Gorbachev agreed to complete disarmament, at least in principle. As a
means of influencing public opinion in support of specific issues, it
is a tried and tested stance. What was different about Gorbachev's
call for complete disarmament by 2000 in January 1986 was that it
included

substantial

verification

measures.

Soviet

negotiators

accepted rigid verification at the Conference on Confidence and
Security-Building Measures just before Reykjavik. A.B. Sherr points
out that at the summit, for the first time, a US President legitimized
the Soviet offer by taking it seriously. (74)
During this period, the call for disarmament was also used as an
additional lever to constrain SDI development. Gorbachev was not slow
to point out that broad disarmament could be achieved if not for US
intransigence over Star Wars.
In the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership launched several public
relations initiatives as part of a political campaign to prevent the
deployment

of

establishment
Mediterranean.

Pershing
of

IIs

nuclear

and GLCMs.

free

zones

They
in

called for

Scandinavia

and

the
the

Colorful rhetoric likened Ronald Reagan to Hitler

leading the world toward nuclear war.

This rhetoric was partly

intended to scare Western publics into pressurizing their governments
to mflkg concessions and to drive a wedge between Western Europe and
c:
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the US. (75)

Such language also served to justify Soviet defence

expenditures to their own people.
Conclusion

This period can be neatly divided into two distinct parts, 197984 and 1984-87 with the INF Treaty the tangible achievement of a shift
in focus of Soviet arms control and disarmament policy under the
leadership of Gorbachev. He managed to forge a poltical will to define
the nuclear balance in Europe after a potentially destabilising build
up in weapons systems not covered by the SALT negotiations.

National

self-interest was the motivating force as a new and potentially more
destabilising race in space armaments was getting underway. Trends
suggested that the gap between the Soviet Union's coequal military
superpower status and their inferior economic power would widen. Even
China was getting its act together.
has been trying to catch up,

Throughout its history, the USSR

so the basic policy response to the

events of the 1980s had familiar features. The USSR

locked into a

military balance as the main element of better relations so that
resources

can

be

diverted

to

non-military

economic

sectors.

'Perestroika' would benefit from it. Improved relations with Western
Europe gained prominence as an explanatory varible in this context.
Arms control and disarmament treaties are the locking devices, but can
bind only where clear balance of force and interest exists. The US and
NATO perception of the military balance in Europe was one of Soviet
superiority

below the strategic parity cemented by the SALT Treaties

through superior conventional forces and the build up of SS-20s which
gave the USSR 'escalation dominance.'

The Soviet perception was one

of parity threatened by new NATO systems, a strategy which lowered the
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nuclear threshold, US qualitative and technological superiority and
SDI which challenged the notion of mutually assured destruction.
No success was achieved at START during this period but the INF Treaty
was a unique example of the locking mechanism, and happens to be the
first instance of nuclear disarmament.

With strict verification,

there can be no clearer balance than if both sides have nothing.
Gorbachev summarized his view this way:
When we submit our proposals at the negotiations, we
proceed from the idea that if we take into account only
the interests of the Soviet Union and ignore the partner's
interests, no agreement will be reached. We call on the
American side to do the same - treat us in the same way
because we will never tolerate the superiority of the other
side or any infringements on our security. And we do not
want to prejudice the USA's security. If both sides display
such an approach, the most resolute headway in all fields of
Soviet-America cooperation will be possible. (76)

CONCLUSION

Russian

and

Soviet

attitudes

toward

arms

limitation

and

disarmament have fluctuated a great deal during the period under
study. This paper has attempted to classify these fluctuations
according to an analytical framework which separates these attitudes
into four categories according to established propensities to refrain
from negotiations, negotiate without serious intent to conclude
agreements, negotiate with serious intent to conclude agreements, and
finally, to conclude agreement with parties perceived as threatening.
This has been undertaken chronologically from 1899 to 1988 with
reference to six explanatory factors. Emphasis has been placed on
necessary versus sufficient conditions with the aim of establishing a
suggestive methodology

for the analysis of Russian/Soviet arms

limitation and disarmament policy formation.
In the course of this century, distinct periods conforming to the
four classifications of negotiation propensities can be identified.
Prior to World War I, the Tsarist Russian Government was not only
favorably disposed to arms limitation but took a leading role in
convening the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

World War I and

the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution did not significantly alter the conduct
and objectives of Soviet peace and disarmament policy although there
was little expectation that meaningful agreements could be reached
with the Capitalist powers, some of whom lent direct support to forces
opposing the Red Army in the civil war following WWI.
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From 1934 to 1945, the international situation left little scope
for arras control negotiation of any sort. From 1945 to 1955, the
Soviet Union engaged in extensive negotiations at the United Nations
without serious intent to reach agreement.

This began to change in

1955 with a shift to meaningful negotiation with intent to reach
agreement leading up to the signing of the 1963 Non-proliferation
Treaty. The process was interrupted in 1957 when the USSR appeared to
hold a lead in ICBM technology. This emphasized the distinction
between the relative capabilities of explosive power and the ability
to deliver those explosives on entry into the nuclear era - the NPT
was based on a parity of explosive power.

Agreement on delivery

vehicles had to wait until the 1970s.
From 1963 to 1969, the Soviet Union negotiated several non
armament treaties with the United States. From 1969 to 1979, the USSR
pursued meaningful arms limitation negotiations and concluded the SALT
I and SALT II Treaties - based on a rough parity of delivery vehicles
and a host of other agreements with the US. This process was
interrupted in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO
plans to deploy a new generation of weapons systems in Europe and the
election of US President Reagan.

From 1982 to 1984, a succession

crisis in the Soviet union overshadowed a return to a more positive
attitude to negotiation for the Soviet leadership.
end of

1987,

a

positive disposition

From 1985 to the

to engage

in meaningful

negotiation resulted in the first disarmament agreement of the nuclear
era, the INF Treaty.
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In many ways, the SALT and INF Treaties were a culmination of a
general Soviet
desirable.

tendency to view arms limitation as ultimately

This underlies the first necessary enabling condition for

the serious conduct of arms control negotiations with the aim of
concluding agreements - political will - and is reflected in the
positive over negative disposition to negotiate throughout the period
under study. The second necessary enabling condition - the one argued
in this study to be the single best factor explaining both why and
when arms limitation was viewed as desirable and achievable by the
Soviet leadership - is the parity of relative military capabilities
with states perceived as threatening to the Soviet Union.
The Russian and Soviet historical experience has led an insecure
leadership to place military strength as the highest priority for
security of national interests.

Prior to World War I, military and

economic weakness exacerbated by technological inferiority prompted
the Tsar to pursue arms limitation agreements in order to avert the
prospect of conflict.

From 1917 to 1934, the same weakness led the

Bolshevik Government to pursue similar objectives in order to provide
a breathing space for reconstruction, and to split the Capitalist
camp. In response to the threat from Nazi Germany and Japan during the
later 1930s, Stalin rejected negotiation and relied on the collective
security of the League of Nations and non-aggression pacts to keep the
USSR from military confrontation.
The nuclear monopoly of the US following the end of World War II
precluded any agreement on nuclear arms control until the USSR has
developed similar capabilities.

By the mid 1950s, the Soviet Union

had acquired an arsenal of nuclear explosive devices - the first area
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where the two parties achieved a parity of capabilities. This
coincided with a more serious tone in Soviet disarmament proposals
which eventually led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1963.

The next area of parity of capabilities was in delivery

vehicles, which was apparent at the end of the 1960s and provided the
basis for the SALT Treaties of the 1970s. Equality and equal security
were seen as prerequisitesfor agreement by the Soviet leadership.
Consequently, the SALT Treaties were hailed as great successes in the
USSR.
From the observable data, one can conclude that military
inferiority will dispose the USSR to negotiate arms limitations whilst
building up her military strength.

Parity of military capabilities

will induce her to seek meaningful arms limitation agreements and
provide the basis for those agreements.
On the brief occasion when the USSR held an apparent
technological advantage over her chief adversary, the late 1950s lead
in ICBM technology, it coincided with a decline in Soviet interest in
agreement. This is where the influence of the perception of trends on
the political will to conduct negotiations with seriousness of intent
can be seen.

Projection of trends had a direct impact on the Soviet

negotiating position as the US remained superior in delivery vehicle
capabilities

(nuclear armed bombers within range of the USSR)

throughout this period, and was reaffirmed by the Cuban missile
crisis.

This

prompted

the

superpowers

to

recognize

equal

responsibility for management of their strategic relationship and
resulted in subsequent ’Hot Line* agreements.
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Regional parity of capabilities has proved to be far more
difficult to quantify.

The INF Treaty required the USSR to destroy a

disproportionate number of missiles in exchange for a clear ’Double
Zero* parity in Europe and the withdrawal of threatening first strike
weapons, Cruise and Pershing IIs - an agreement to cancel out
quantitative and qualitative advantages.

The Soviet aim was also to

foster an international environment in which the economic burdens of
engaging in another round of the arms race could be averted and Soviet
resources directed toward more pressing domestic needs.
The USSR has shown itself to be less technologically innovative
than other world powers and has consequently been more reactive to
change.

It was in order to address the advances in artillery

technology by Germany before 1914 that the Tsar called for a peace
conference in 1898, knowing that if war broke out, Russia would be at
a severe disadvantage.

In terms of the US nuclear monopoly following

WWII, an arms control agreement would have constrained Soviet efforts
to acquire a similar capability.

The missile advances in the 1960s,

ABN and MXRVing technology prior to SALT and SDI technology in the
1980s were strong incentives for the USSR to negotiate arms control
agreements as without them, the Soviet leadership could expect to lose
their much sought after parity.
Soviet pronouncements have persistently stressed the economic
benefits to be gained from disarmament.

The chief reason for the

Tsar’s wish to prevent the outbreak of war was a realization that his
regime could not withstand the economic and social burdens of war.
Peace negotiations after 1917 gave the new regime time to embark on
its New Economic Policy (NEP).

Economic problems with the failings of
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the ’Virgin Lands* campaign at the end of the 1950s stimulated
Khrushchev to seek accommodation with the US. Arms control was seen as
a way to permit reallocation of resources to agriculture.

Again in

the late 1960s, economic deceleration provided additional stimulation
for Brezhnev to pursue detente in order to give the Soviet economy
transfusions of foreign technology and capital. The background to the
INF and START talks was Gorbachev’s assessment of the Soviet economy
being close to crisis and the adoption of sweeping measures under the
banner of ’Perestroika* to induce improvements in both consumer and
agricultural production, also with the aid of foreign capital and
technology.
Three events indicate that despite the prominence of economic
imperatives, the Soviet leadership did hot view this factor as an
overriding determinant of their foreign policy.

In 1922, the USSR

proposed to her neighbors a 25% reduction of force levels. The
neighbors did not agree and yet by February 1923, the Red Army had
been unilaterally cut by 25%.

In 1960, the USSR unilaterally cut

force levels again and in 1963 reduced its military budget without
soliciting similar responses from the US.

Other than these examples,

the USSR has shown itself willing to bear the burden of an arms race
if militarily inferior.

It is one area where the USSR is in free

competition with the West.
One factor consistent with Soviet disposition to conclude
agreements with the US is the threat posed to the USSR by China.

It

was following the the Sino-Soviet split of 1959/60 that the NonProliferation Treaty was signed.
directly

aimed

at prohibiting

The Chinese perceived this to be
their acquisition

of a nuclear
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capability.

In 1969, massive border clashes took place and it was

immediately following these that the USSR began the SALT negotiations
with the US. The prospect of a Sino-American rapprochement during the
1970s was contrary to the Soviet objective of keeping China militarily
and economically isolated and provided an additional stimulus for
talks.

The thesis that the state of relations with China are

indicative of Soviet willingness to conclude agreements can only be
really tested if a genuine rapprochement between China and the USSR
takes place.

The thesis posits that this event would incline the

Soviets away from arms limitation.
Soviet domestic political considerations is another explanatory
factor, albeit a minor one. During the post-Stalin and post-Krushchev
succession crises, Khrushchev and Brezhnev aligned themselves with
military interests as a means to further their power positions.

Once

in control, they supported a serious arms control effort leading to
the NPT of 1963 and the SALT Treaties of the 1970s.

To a certain

extent, both invested their prestige in the success of negotiations
with the West.
Propaganda has always been a part of Soviet disarmament proposals
since the first General and Complete Disarmament plan of 1927.

This

aspect of Soviet policy can most clearly be seen during those times
when

the

USSR does

not

pursue negotiations

with

full vigor.

Overarabitious proposals buy time. They show the Soviets to be
’Champions of Peace. * They cast capitalist powers as disinterested in
agreement.

They have attempted to reduce US willingness to use

nuclear weapons, especially in the immediate post-WWII period. They
have also been attempts to divide the West/NATO.

107

The thesis that the advent of the nuclear era provoked a more
serious attitude to arms limitation is weakened by the fact that there
is and can only be one data point - the start of the nuclear era.
This did coincide with a shift to a more serious Soviet position.
After Stalin*s death, the Soviets stressed the devastating effects of
nuclear war, they sought to reduce the risk of its outbreak and
enhanced crisis management through agreement with the US,
missile crisis was a

The Cuban

sobering experience and the,momentum of arms

control has generally increased ever since. Arms control has become a
major arena

for

relationship.

the management of

the superpower's

strategic

However, nuclear weapons have also provided the USSR

with its clearest symbol of superpower status with all the political
benefits that accompany it.
These are the sufficient conditions for the Russian/Soviet
leadership to have a positive disposition toward arms control and
disarmament negotiations and together form the basis of a political
will to conclude agreements.

This study has shown that the necessary

condition for the conclusion of arms control negotiations with
meaningful agreements has been the parity of relative military
capabilities with states perceived as threatening to the Soviet Union.
Whilst depending on military assurances of security above all things,
to paraphrase W.C Clemens, 'the historical record indicates that the
long term trends of Soviet external behavior (and domestic economic
and political concerns) have been compatible with measures to contain
the arms race.'

(W.C. Clemens, The Superpowers and Arms Control, p. xxii.)
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